Welcome. First time blogging. I guess we'll see how good I am at it, if it requires any real skill.
It has been an eventful month. First, a highly suspicious looking crash in Cameroon of a six-month old 737-800, with the chief suspect as told by the press being dual engine failure at low altitude. As you can see on my "Rollerstamping Crashes" page, I go into a little detail about these 737NG engines, and give my opinion about the cause of the crash (edit: the noted page has been revised since this blog was originally written and it no longer has the noted crash information). As you know, I have tried for years to reform both Boeing and the FAA, so, if the crash is because of the corruption documented on this site as I suspect, I will have failed in my efforts to save lives by getting reform before more people died because of the fraud documented on this site. Not a pleasant thought. Flying always has some level of risk apart from mechanical failure, but if it is something preventable like a Quality System failure at Boeing, that would make it all the more tragic than it already is.
Secondly, the 787 production line started up last week in Everett, thanks to me. I wonder if Boeing is still livid in that they blame me for 787 Final Assembly being in Everett, instead of their preferred site of a non-union state. We'll see. Anyway, I haven't received any correspondence from those workers on the 787 production line thanking me for their jobs, LOL.
Boeing is surely not happy that IAM union workers are performing Boeing's small part of manufacturing the 787, but if they can't put up with the union I guess those LCFs will make it easy to pack up the production line and ship it to the non-union location they always wanted it in.
There is little positive, however, in me supposedly getting 787 Final Assembly sited in Everett. There's not many jobs there doing the work because the vast majority of them were outsourced to non-union locations. I wonder if airliners have to have stickers like other things do if they are mostly manufactured in another country or manufacturer.
The 787 is the first Boeing plane I believe that would risk having to have a "made in Japan" stencil on it due to the unprecedented level of outsourcing on the program.
Japan is surely in the transport aircraft manufacturing industry now as the builder of the majority of such an airplane, as they wanted--just without the official designation. As Boeing has enough pull, I don't think they'll have to put a prominent "made in Japan" sticker on it, even if one is required, LOL.
As you know if you are no stranger to my website, I am very concerned about the viability of the 787 program. My Quality Director that had me confined to a desk job for the "crime" of trying to actually do my job inspecting critical aircraft components is now head of the 787 quality system. Need I say more about my trepidation about the quality, safety, and reliability of the 787? I wonder if inspectors have gotten in trouble if they find defects in the sections delivered from the 787 suppliers, like I used to get in trouble for doing when I worked where he was Quality Director.
If you are one of the very few unfortunate inspectors on the program, please contact me with your experiences. Of course, the 787 is on a lengthy cycle right now. I don't expect inspectors there will really be under the gun to rollerstamp until the cycle gets closer to the three days advertised.
Another problem with the 787 program is that the same corrupt FAA is involved, likely delegating functions on the program to Boeing it should never have delegated. Less oversight of Boeing by a corrupt FAA on a critical new program. What possibly could go wrong in that scenario? Of course, I don't know how much has been delegated to Boeing with "self-oversight" on the program as I was removed from the position I could have monitored such highly questionable activities from.
At least now that you have perused this site, after the FAA and Boeing management have their usual back slapping party when the FAA signs off on certification for the 787, you'll know not to invest too much confidence in that milestone than you otherwise would if you didn't know what you know now about how corrupt and biased against your interests the FAA has become.
I am merging several pages into this blog as I reformat my site, so it will be segmented like this until I start posting after the "merger."
I expect to have some big news on this site soon, so check back weekly or sooner, if you wish.
The Last Inspector,
Today's Daily Report Quote:
This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report:
Our QA Department let’s shop work tags that have not been approved yet. That makes that rework illegal rework. Case in point, which I reiterate:
On 1/13/02, a Sunday overtime day. I told (my QA Lead) that an NCR, (number) had not been approved yet, and was in fact still enqueued in the next task after initiation, QA approval, as (name), the designated QA MRB person that weekend, had never been called from home yet to do his function. The NCR didn’t even have a disposition at that point. I told (my QA Lead) that the mechanics wouldn’t be able to legally work it until it was approved or had a disposition, even though the disposition would probably be the same as the prior unit on the NCR, which would hold up installation of the inlet on the (747) POS 4 engine. He said to tell the mechanics that they could work it, and to tell them it was him that said it was OK. He then said "I’ve been in jail before, I guess I can go to jail again" if someone called him on it.
Another example: NCR (number) on a 767 EBU (Engine Build-Up) mislocated vendor nutplate on a W/B (Wire Bundle) bracket. I overheard (a fellow inspector) complain to (the Manufacturing Lead) that the shop working the tag before it was approved, like they had done on the noted NCR, would bite us during ACSEP time. (The Manufacturing Lead) said that (his supervisor) had authorized them to work it before the disposition was approved.
Another example: On NCR (number), shop made up their own unauthorized disposition, and instead of removing and replacing the link of the engine mount like the NCR stated, they replaced the whole engine mount without the required revision to the tag to authorize it.
The above first example emphasizes our QA Management’s inability to perform their QA function with any integrity at all, as Manufacturing’s God-like status and requirements at BCAG, such as delivering the product on time, under cost, and with no travelers, trumps any of our QA requirements, even those of you, the FAA. Please investigate this incident and interview others to find more. Please document your findings.