I guess I was lucky. I just learned that the harassment and retaliation I experienced frequently at Boeing for near a decade just because I tried to do my critical job of inspecting the construction of Boeing aircraft instead of just rollerstamping jobs off without inspecting the work was perhaps not the worst Boeing could have done to me.
Although the harassment and retaliation I experienced at Boeing's hands seemed like torture, I don't think it was worse than what the people experienced that Boeing actually took to be tortured.
The line that is most ominous from the Seattle Times version of the story is this one:
'(Jane) Mayer (in an article she wrote in the New Yorker magazine) wrote that "a former Jeppesen (a Boeing subsidary) employee told her he heard a senior company official say at a board meeting: "We do all of the extraordinary rendition flights — you know, the torture flights. Let's face it, some of these flights end up that way."'
So, if Boeing wants to give you a free ride on a plane, you might want to think twice or more about it. Although Boeing breaks the law at will in its factories in the U.S. as noted on this site, there are more protections of your rights here in the U.S. than you'd have on one of these "torture flights" Boeing did/does for a price.
This brings new meaning to that Boeing commercial I heard twice today on TV -- "We know why we're here." That senior Boeing official in the board meeting as noted in the news story sure seemed to know what he was doing there. "We do all of the...torture flights." Somehow I don't think you'll see Boeing working that service they provide into their "Why we're here" commercials, with the senior Boeing manager noted in the article stating at the end of the commercial, "that's why we're here."
You'll also notice in the linked article that Both the government and Boeing conveniently hide behind supposed confidentiality policies so they won't have to admit to any of it or talk about it at all.
It would be one thing if Boeing transported these people to destinations and they knew nothing about the horrors that the CIA contractors had done to them after the flight. But the article shows Boeing was fully aware of what they were facilitating for a price. So much for Boeing ethics. If I was still a Boeing employee, I couldn't wait to see if they added that scenario to the annual ethics training: "If you were performing a contract transporting people and it came to your attention you and your client were violating the Constitution and perhaps other laws of the land by doing so, and that you were delivering the people to be tortured outside the bounds of law, what would be the ethical thing to do?--pick either A, B, C, D, or E." Just as in the case of the commercial, I would guess you would never see that in the training.
So what more evidence do you need that Boeing enterprise wide is still a very ethically challenged company, and that profits still trump ethics and following laws? You have this new case, as well as the others I witnessed documented on this site.
I guess, after the above truth telling, Boeing may want to persecute me further by giving me such a free flight to "torture-ville."
Now I understand more than ever why Boeing has tortured me over the years with threats to my job, my person, my pay, confinement away from my job, termination, threatened prosecution, etc.
If I was a deranged P.R. person, I might advise Boeing to go on the offensive with this, and try to convince the public Boeing did it because of extreme patriotism, helping the endless fight against terrorism. 28 percent of the public may believe it.
I expect Congress will strip the DOD and Boeing of their confidentiality protections so they can both testify to what happened in detail before a Congressional investigation into these troubling events.
Today's Daily Report Quote:
This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report:
If you think this is just a peculiarity of (my QA supervisor’s) corrupt management style, think again. (Name), one of my QA Supervisors in Everett, had a similar tact, proving that this is just another in the corrupt BCAG QA Supervisor’s bag of tricks. (The QA supervisor in Everett) would say that QA is only concerned about the "fit, form, and function" of the product when he wanted an inspector to cease worrying about non-value-added FAA-approved Procedures or even drawing requirements, if they didn’t affect the "fit, form, and function" of the product.
He said that in at least one crew meeting, and told it to me directly at least once.
The time he told it to me directly was when I noticed that shop was lifting and installing the Ailerons on the 777 by man-handling them into position, making damaging them much more likely, but saving time, when there was an OHME (Over Head Mechanical Equipment) tool that was specifically designed to be used to lift them into installation position.
I knew that, as I used to install the 777 Ailerons when I was a mechanic in the area. There was a cautionary general note (general note 2 of drawing (I.D. number) sheet PL revision H and prior) on the drawing stating (something to the effect that ) "Aileron assembly to be moved by GSE hoist points only. Improper handling of Aileron can result in serious injury and damage to the Aileron."
I assume this was to protect the delicate composite part from damage during movement from the SME (Shipping Mechanical Equipment) to installation on the A/P. The job that installed the Aileron also made clear to use the OHME to install the part. We all, mechanics and inspectors, had been sent to classes on the 777 Program on the correct handling of composite parts to prevent damage. I asked (name), my lead, if I should write shop up for that, informing him that there was a general note on the drawing. (My QA supervisor) was right there listening, and angrily interrupted, telling me not to worry about it, as we were only concerned about "fit, form, and function of the parts we inspect," and if shop wanted to ignore the drawing note, that was their prerogative.
I later understood (my QA supervisor's) BCAG QA Supervisor philosophy in dealing with my seemingly cloned other QA Supervisors, and was "shown the light" brightly by (my later QA supervisor) in the 1/11/02 meeting, which made everything crystal clear: all our airplanes were designed to fly without any part, including both Ailerons, so we didn’t have to inspect them at all, only train mechanics that never seemed to want to be trained.
Only Airbus’ plane’s designs, which were much inferior to ours, required inspection, as they haven’t yet mastered the advanced design of the airplanes that Boeing builds, that allows the airplane to fly without any part, even engine wire bundles, Ailerons, or Vertical Stabilizers. Airbus’ designs obviously are bad, as all of their planes (which their inspection department has actually made sure are built 100% per design, because they know they must 100% inspect them because they are aware their designs are barely within the safety envelope when built perfectly) disintegrate in flight in only seconds when only the Vertical Stabilizer is missing.
Boeing can, however, skimp on required inspections, ignoring the FAA requirements for us to inspect all installations due to our fool-mechanic-proof designs, thereby enhancing shareholder value by forgoing the costly FAA-required documenting and reworking of defects that could never cause the airplane to crash anyway. Some of our non-naive customers may know all about this, and say nothing, because they know Boeing will split the costs saved by roller stamping the required inspections with them.
Half will go to more profits for Boeing, and half will go to the customers by cheaper airplane prices.
It’s a win-win situation, unless you’re an ethical BCAG Line Inspector who gets disciplined for doing his job, an airline passenger on a Boeing plane, or a naive airline that thinks their 180 million dollar airplane was inspected before they got it.
Please investigate this corrupt practice of QA Supervisors telling line inspectors that Policies and Procedures, such as the FAA-approved BCAG Quality Manual, are only guidelines. Talk to (one of my fellow line inspectors). If the 777 Aileron incident bothers you as it bothered me, please check into it also. They finally changed the drawing, making their unwise method of installing the Aileron by manhandling it at least not illegal, by releasing ADCN 7 of the noted PL that stated that use of the tool was only required when removing the Aileron, some two years after my scolding from (my QA supervisor in Everett).
I found out, by reading your Order 8120.2b section 141, that our QA Supervisors are lying to us about this subject. Of course that doesn’t surprise me in the least. The noted section states: "(Quality Control or inspection system) data may include a quality manual, procedures, policies, standards, instructions, and/or processes." So much for truth in QA Supervising at BCAG.