Another thing to note about Boeing's (through the King County Prosecutor's Department) potential charges against me is the recent passing of Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor. Mr. Maleng had a reputation of being fair minded when it came to doing his job, which I personally believe is an unusual trait in Republicans such as he was for many reasons, so that was another reason I thought that I would not be charged, no matter how much pressure Boeing brought to bear upon him to charge me.
Now, however, with his passing all bets are off, and a new prosecutor is running the place. Will they be as fair minded as Mr. Maleng was? As they have no history in that position, that is an open question. They will have to prove themselves, especially if they want to run for the office in the next election.
That's another reason I think the new County Prosecutor won't allow me to be charged--who wants to go into an election trying to put away someone who was trying desperately to save the lives of the public, who may have technically crossed some legal lines in the process that had no demonstrable negative affect on anyone, and who never profited from these supposed "crimes" in any way (actually this quest has cost me dearly).
Actually, if the new County Prosecutor wanted to make a name for themselves before the election, there is much evidence that I collected and they took from me that points to much bigger fish than me to fry.
In fact, from what I have witnessed and documented on the computers in their possession, they could file serious charges against the real criminals in this whole affair--the management at Boeing that coerced employees with critical jobs to the safety of the public like I had there not to do their jobs just to smooth production flow and allow defects to deliver to customers rather than spending the money and time to find, document, and fix them, thereby saving the company money as well as flow time.
These manager's illegal acts did place the public at unknown levels of extra risk, and they profited from those crimes as well both personally (via bonuses and promotions) and for the company. This fraud is so huge I don't think the King County Fraud Department would have the manpower at the moment to handle it. Product substitution fraud. Unapproved parts fraud. False Claims. RICO cases. All are potential avenues that the crime I and many others witnessed could theoretically be prosecuted.
Maybe that is what is taking so much time. Once they found out in my interview with detectives about my whistleblower status and reports to the FAA, they should have gotten very curious why Boeing would withhold such information from them just to get me arrested and charged as a common criminal. Maybe they are doing the right thing and investigating the crimes by Boeing Management that they have ample evidence of on my computer. In that case, it would not be me that would be the one charged--it would be the guilty parties I was seeking to bring to justice, instead, who committed real, extremely serious crimes--padding their and the company's bank accounts by ignoring regulations and placing the public at extra risk of an unspeakably horrifying death. As I've stated before--I would gladly do the time for my "crime" if Boeing Management would do their vastly greater time for their much more serious crimes. It would be a small price to pay to ensure real justice is served for the real criminality in this matter.
Today's Daily Report Quote:
This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report.
This section documents the lack of concern by Key Engineers about safety device issues and the fact that budget matters trump safety at Boeing, even in the most obvious safety related areas, such as safety device integrity. I believe this safety device specification issue was partially fixed just months before my termination, some six years after I formally brought it to the attention of the approriate engineering department.
This was well after Boeing corporate management and the FAA had refused to fix it on the multiple occasions I notified them of it. I believe the change that partially fixed this critical problem that allowed untold numbers of defective (insufficient strength) critical safety devices to deliver to BCA customers with the full knowledge of Boeing and the FAA occurred when a new Key Engineer was assigned to the spec. As this is a long section, I am quoting the section sequentially over several days:
Anyway, after about four months the new key engineer of the spec, (name), wrote back and stated that he was going to change the spec as I requested, and it would state that a minimum of half the ferrule on .020" diameter safety cable installations had to be crimped to pass inspection. I just about lost control of my bowels! It had always been mostly my experience at Boeing that nearly all engineers I meet and have to work with seem to have bought their degrees.
They show no evidence of the smarts I would think they would have to have helped engineer the most complex machines man has yet produced. Some seem no smarter than the M.E.s (Manufacturing Engineers), who I had always little real respect for (though I always showed them respect, as that was my professional habit while on the clock at Boeing), as I could write circles around any of them I met when it came to writing plans, as I knew the minimum requirements, and they seemed not to, or not to give a damn if they did.
If I really looked, I could find errors in meeting the minimum requirements on probably 95% of the plans I inspected, due to their quality of being ineptly written. The five percent of jobs that were OK probably were only one or two pages long, and the only reason there were no errors was that the M.E. that wrote one had got unlucky, and due to the shortness of the job, had written it without the seemingly mandatory mistakes. M.E.s seemed only to be at Boeing as sort of a corporate welfare program, and the quality of their work was unmonitored as they really weren‘t required to do any--the same program us line inspectors were supposed to be on according to (my QA supervisor's) meeting with me.
In fact, that brings to mind one of the inept few slogans I had thought up even prior to my 1/11/02 meeting with (my QA supervisor). I had always been bothered that no one, not even QA Management, whose job it supposedly was to care (except for maybe the few competent line inspectors), seemed to care if us line inspectors did our jobs or not, or did them to any minimum standards at all.
The electrical bonding inspections come to mind in this respect, as all inspectors are allowed to do the inspection on any point on the scale, from pure roller stamping it without any inspection, to going to get the meters themselves and checking it (my method), even though line inspectors have several times, most recently (name) at our 1/30/02 crew meeting, pleaded with our QA Management to fix this problem and force some minimum standards of inspection, to no avail whatsoever.
I had once thought of the slogan "There is no quality in Quality" for our quality organization to capture this careless spirit. I even said this to some mechanic or coworker once, I believe, though who I "joked" it to I don’t remember. I thought of it because I was bothered by the fact (that I would learn later in the 1/11/02 meeting was really a lie) that we, as QA Line Inspectors, were supposed to ensure the quality of the mechanic’s work, but no one ensured, as they didn’t seem to care, that we as line inspectors did our work with some minimum level of quality.
That seeming paradox doesn’t bother me anymore, obviously, as (my QA supervisor's) meeting of 1/11/02 brought crystal clarity to why that paradox used to exist for me, and why that paradox still painfully exists in the minds of some inspectors, like (name), that still blindly and falsely think that BCAG wants them to ensure the quality of the work done.
Those inspectors who finally "get it," as I have, whether they wanted to or not, even being force-fed it in my case by (my QA supervisor) in that 1/11/02 meeting, much like the analogy (brace yourself) of a perfectly healthy baby being strapped to a high chair, and force-fed rancid baby food, no matter how hard the baby tries to turn its head away to avoid it being forcefully spooned into its mouth, or how hard it tried to close its mouth or spit the poison out, those inspectors that finally "get it," understand that no such paradox should exist, as our jobs are not to inspect, but to only pretend to train mechanics that don’t want any training and to collect our welfare checks until Boeing forces us to get real jobs, getting rid of our dead weight to the bottom line by making the currently surreptitiously employed System of self-inspection official, and then casts us to the wind. (Please submit the preceding sentence to the Guinness Book of Records people for "longest sentence ever written," I don’t have time to break it up!)