Boeing has just announced their big P.R. event for the rollout of the 787, which (just a coincidence, of course) is going to take place on 7-8-07 to celebrate the culmination of the outsourcing of the vast majority of 787 production to other countries and companies.
Surprisingly, they will celebrate on that day with representatives of the second and third world countries and areas of this nation that really manufacture this new "Boeing" jet, who will no doubt hold back snickers when they see the Boeing logo on the 787 as it rolls out. I look forward to seeing that kid from "Deliverance" from North Carolina, where much of the 787 is built by suppliers for Boeing, playing the Banjo during the ceremony. It will be interesting to see what he looks like after all of these years after he became famous through that film.
I have never been to the South, so my knowledge of that place is strongly influenced by such films. I know Boeing Management must visit vendors there who actually build the 787, as news just surfaced that Boeing's unhappiness caused the firing of a supplier executive there that was on the job for a brief time. I don't suppose those visiting Boeing executives go rafting down the rivers there much in their free time bow hunting, but you never know, as they may not have seen the movie that would make any heterosexual male cringe at the thought. I can think of some corrupt Boeing managers that may be deserving of such an apparently life changing (if you survive it) rafting adventure, but they may not be the ones going down to check on their Southern Folk vendors.
I guess that's enough analogies and sarcasm for today.
Anyway, Boeing is renting Qwest field, the home stadium of the Superbowl XL Champion Seahawks (that is, if the refs hadn't acted like they were on the Steeler's secret payroll) so that Boeing retirees and current workers that work on Boeing programs where Boeing actually manufactures the jets they sell and a significant other can sit and sob and have their faces rubbed in the astro-turf while watching Boeing's outsourcing of their and their progeny's futures off to the lowest non-union bidder.
Of course, many of those current and former Boeing workers may get caught up in all the spectacle and forget they are watching an event meant to make it seem like Boeing builds this jet with local and loyal labor as it has historically done for the most part over the years, and may be made to feel some sort of pride in this jet built by anyone but Boeing, and just "snapped together" and having the Boeing logo disingenuously slapped on it before all the foreign (to Boeing) built parts of the plane exit the Boeing factory in formation in order to lend some minor legitimacy to the Boeing logo on the jet.
Why did Boeing retain only 35% of the airframe manufacture at the time of the announcement of airframe Make-Buy decisions by Boeing or the Seattle Times (whichever one first disclosed this info), the same percentage as the next airframe supplier, Japan, and why didn't they retain 34% or less and give a correspondingly higher share to Japan? It should be obvious. It didn't just magically end up at those numbers where Boeing was listed as the largest maker of the airframe even though they did the same amount of work as Japan. Obviously they made sure Boeing didn't have any more or less of the airframe than the next largest supplier just for P.R. purposes. If Boeing hadn't let possible public outcry of it building less of the airliner than other suppliers come into their thinking, I believe the 35% Boeing share would have been much, much less.
But, we forget something that Boeing wanted us to forget--that 35% figure is bogus.
Whether it was accurate at the time is open to its own conjecture as, as this site has shown, Boeing and the truth part company frequently. But what is not disputable is something Boeing has never acknowledged--that due to the sale of the Wichita plant and other factors, that 35% Boeing announced back then is now much, much less.
Boeing hasn't announced revised and up-to-date figures since the bogus 35% claim, so we'll have to speculate on what Boeing's share of 787 airframe production now is. I think a 10% "guesstimate" would be plausible, but it could also be 5%. Are you still thinking Boeing builds most of (or the same amount as the largest supplier on the program) the 787? Right, I didn't think so.
So what will be people be celebrating on 7-8-07 as the Japanese dancers cavort around with their paper dragons celebrating the rollout of what is really an airplane built mostly by them and therefore deserves not the "Boeing" logo, but the "Made in Japan" logo? They will be the largely unwilling participants in a celebration by Boeing executives of the death of the company as an airplane manufacturer, as well as unwittingly celebrating with executives the attainment one of Boeing's long sought goals--the death of unions at Boeing.
So, I'd advise any current or former Boeing employee who goes to this event to not be played by Boeing during this P.R. and marketing event. There is no reason for anyone at Boeing who were not one of the few hundred actual workers who "snapped together" the outsourced components of the 787 to feel any pride or celebrate. If there is any celebration, it should be in remembrance of the dead Boeing of the past that actually built airplanes, whose coffin is in fact the 787 that will ceremoniously rollout of a Boeing factory door on 7-8-07.
It is not a Boeing jet, and any "Boeing workers" in Engineering who designed parts of this airplane were not really Boeing employees. They were just Boeing supplied "temps" who actually worked for the suppliers performing design work so they could build their "Made in Japan" airplane. Less of these "Boeing" temp Engineers will be needed on future "Boeing" airplane development projects, as the suppliers have been taught how to do that work themselves by this program, so they won't have to use Boeing's Engineer "temp service" as much, by far.
And if you are at that event and want to celebrate the Boeing built components of the 787 rather than all of the other parts of the plane that weren't built by Boeing, just stare at the vertical fin at the back of the plane while you cheer, ignoring the shiny leading edge of it and the rudder at the back of it, which were built elsewhere. The rest of the plane you can ignore, as Boeing didn't build any major components of any other section of the plane.
You can bet, however small the part of this program is that you can feel Boeing pride in, that the Boeing executives that are behind this pyramid scam-like business model will be celebrating, unbridled by any conscience, celebrating what they did to exterminate U.S. aerospace workers by the business plan of the 787. After all, it is a program they designed to benefit themselves and by chance other large stockholders of the company like them at the expense of anyone below their golden spoon born station in life.
Just to make the 787 seem like a Boeing produced plane, Boeing will have Frank Schrontz, CEO of Boeing when Boeing actually manufactured the vast majority of each airplane it sold and rightly sported the Boeing logo, make an appearance at the event to attach Boeing nostalgia to a plane that isn't built by Boeing, for the most part, literally.
Bob Watt will also be there, fittingly. I think he was the guy tasked with damage control locally for all of Boeing's anti-Boeing worker outsourcing decisions on this program so Boeing employees wouldn't riot or quit building the legacy airplanes Boeing still needs to produce to finance the 787 and provide pay and stock options for executives, which proves the true reason for this event.
Bob Watt can thank me, however, for making his job much easier. If not for me this event would be taking place in North Carolina, and Bob would have a huge job to do of quelling the bad feelings of Boeing workers here so production could go on until those employee's jobs were ultimately outsourced when the next new A/P program came along. I doubt he would have succeeded at such a huge task. His job is now a breeze from what he expected it would be. As, per Boeing's belief, I am the only reason the 787 is rolling out in Everett instead of North Carolina, he has me to thank for the 787 being "snapped together" here with union labor, rather than in non-union, Banjo and family loving North Carolina.
It's too bad they don't come to terms with their anger towards me for being (per them) the reason they couldn't site 787 final assembly as planned. Then they could at least thank me at the ceremony for being instrumental in Boeing deciding to stay in Washington. A good cheer from a crowd in Qwest stadium for my saving their jobs and airliner production in this state may do my ego (or what's left of it) good. It's too bad that this will likely be the only "harm" against Boeing I supposedly inflicted that they will demonstrate in court when they have me prosecuted. Even if they prove I did this, I don't think any local jury will fault me for it, even if they can demonstrate the lower cost of non-union Banjo playing workers in North Carolina would add a few tenths of a percent to their already ungodly profits. But then there is the all important (to Boeing) P.R. that holds up the Boeing house of cards. Even though they told me in private that I was the reason for the 787 being sited in Washington, why would they want to confirm that in a public courtroom? It certainly wouldn't reflect well on them, crying in court they were stopped from "outsourcing" final assembly of the 787, in addition to every other thing but the galley sink, that they had already outsourced at the time.
Hopefully current and former Boeing employees and the public will see this charade for what it really is. If they do, they certainly won't be celebrating.
Today's Daily Report Quote:
This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report.
This section documents the lack of concern by Key Engineers about safety device issues and the fact that budget matters trump safety at Boeing, even in the most obvious safety related areas, such as safety device integrity. I believe this safety device specification issue was partially fixed just months before my termination, some six years after I formally brought it to the attention of the appropriate engineering department. This was well after Boeing corporate management and the FAA had refused to fix it on the multiple occasions I notified them of it.
I believe the change that partially fixed this critical problem that allowed untold numbers of defective (insufficient strength) critical safety devices to deliver to BCA customers with the full knowledge of Boeing and the FAA occurred when a new Key Engineer was assigned to the spec. Of course, the hundreds if not many thousands of defective safety devices allowed to deliver on airplanes because of this problem and the rollerstamping quality system in place at Boeing are still flying around, uncorrected. As this is a long section, I am quoting the section sequentially over several days:
Thousands of these discrepant safety cable installations had been made prior to me contacting (him), and supposedly competent inspectors inspected every one of them and were supposed to know the spec when they inspected, but none of them had obviously written an NCR on this problem as of my call to (the Key Engineer) a few months ago. None of them apparently wanted to be panhandlers, like I didn’t. Nobody seems to care about this safety device requirement at Boeing except me. Please make everybody here care. Also, you may want to ask engineering about what size safety cable the (dimension) minimum crimp length is for. I assumed for my RDR that it is for both .030" diameter and .040" diameter safety cable ferrules. If competent engineering looked into this, then three crimp lengths may even be required, with a longer one for .040" safety cable ferrules. My RDR did not cover .040" safety cable crimps.
This just in: I stamped in on a "job complete" inspection on the call sheet for (name), 747/767 EBU mechanic (I believe the job number and unit was (number) on (customer I.D.) POS 4). There was a safety device inspection that wasn’t yet bought off, so I inspected them (novel concept at PSD, I know). It was the infamous .020" safety cables installed on bolts on the 14th stage duct flanges. When I looked at the crimps on the ferrules for just curiosity purposes (as I couldn’t inspect them because there was no valid standards for inspection as I noted), I noticed that some were crimped about two-thirds of the length of the ferrule, and some were about half that, one-third of the length of the ferrule. I probably would have "written" up the one-third length crimped ferrules if I had a spec I could write them up to. Hopefully they’ll still perform their function.
This just in (it is now 3/13/02): I found a Program Bulletin (I.D. number) from the Space Shuttle program that identifies safety cables falling off of the Main Engines (as they will probably fall off of our engines) due to insufficient crimping of the ferrules. See Exhibit AO. It’s interesting to note that our planes carry orders of magnitude more people than the Space Shuttle does.
This also just in (it is now 4/8/02): I had emailed (name), who wrote the noted SSME Program Bulletin, several weeks ago, and only recently received a return phone call. I had emailed him to ask what their minimum crimp lengths on the ferrules were, if they had such a requirement in their (I.D. number) spec, thinking they might have come up with such standards after all their problems with safety cable. He said that they had found in their investigation that it was a certain brand of safety cable tool that they thought had created the problems, due to the fact it had an adjustable depth that the ferrule could enter the tool nosepiece that had not been calibrated. He said that they had just eliminated the adjustable tool type and allowed safety cable to be used again after some lab testing. I told him of our problem with insufficient crimps, and that it was due to operator error during use of the tool that created the insufficient crimps. He seemed surprised, and said that perhaps they should check into that. That was pretty much the phone call. Maybe I averted the next Challenger accident by getting him to look into operator error and lack of crimp length standards on SSME safety cable! Yeah, I know. Delusions of grandeur. Just like the guy who spoke up about the o-ring problems before the Challenger disaster probably had before he realized noone would listen to his dire warnings due to their own political agendas.
The Last Inspector