This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report. (Continued from previous day's quote):
(The noted inspector) was working the 737NG line one day, taking the place of an absent inspector, when he noticed, or was told by a mechanic, that the safety cable hole in the (part number) bracket was larger than the .XXX" maximum requirement in (the BAC spec). He checked with the engineers (I think in MRB, but it could have been the Project Engineers that designed the bracket), and they agreed with him that it was Engineering error and needed to be fixed. (He) started to write a tag on it. Somehow (our QA supervisor) found out about it (probably by the Manufacturing Leads complaining to him that (the inspector) was going to write a costly tag on the EBUs (Engine Build-Ups)). This is where the unbelievably bad judgment (that happens when QA Management allows cost and schedule considerations to cloud, or replace, rational thought) comes in. (Our QA supervisor) told (him) not to write the tag "as it was designed that way." Hard to believe, isn’t it? You’d expect that BCAG QA Supervisors, who are in effect making the judgments that FAA personnel would make if we didn’t have a PC (Production Certificate), would make the same judgment an impartial FAA ASI manager would make in this situation, which would be to have the ASI write the tag, and getting a line check done to ensure the safety devices in the fleet wouldn’t fail. But no. Our management is corrupted to the point where they are unable and/or unwilling to make valid judgments based even on the flight safety of our products. They only consider cost and schedule concerns, just as their twins, unethical Manufacturing Managers do. The recount of what happened that day on the 737NG line is from only what I heard from (the inspector). Please see him for exact details.
The Last Inspector