Crashes Because of Rollerstamping
This page is for documenting the Boeing airplane crashes that have happened because of the rollerstamping fraud going on to this day in quality assurance at Boeing per Boeing Management direction.
Yes, horrific crashes have occurred due to rollerstamping at Boeing. Innocent blood is already on the hands of the Boeing Management that were responsible for the rollerstamping that caused the crashes that I will detail below. But, as horrific as these crashes are that can be traced to rollerstamping work off as acceptable when it was not inspected with the care required (or inspected at all), the people who died and were maimed in these "accidents" have already suffered their own personal horrific end on their own Boeing "flying rollercoaster of death" and that unfortunately can never be undone.
More such "accidents" are all but inevitable because of the rollerstamping at Boeing in the past and the present.
My Boeing QA managers routinely told inspectors like me that "quality cannot be inspected in--it must be built in." I think that false mantra that some previous corrupt Boeing manager drilled into them is part of what causes them to continue to do the opposite of their critical jobs in many cases, "overlooking" and abetting the rollerstamping going on at Boeing in quality assurance, instead of doing what is supposed to be their jobs--ensuring their inspectors are actually doing their jobs, not just pretending to do them.
The reason the "quality cannot be inspected in--it must be built in" is just one more false reason that corrupt Boeing Management subverts Boeing's critical to public safety quality system is that inspectors' jobs at Boeing are supposed to be to ensure airplane components that "the quality (and safety) was not built into" by mechanics do not get delivered to customers in that state, and instead those defects are documented and corrected by mechanics "building in the required quality" before delivery.
Inspectors never have "inspected quality into" airplanes or airplane components at Boeing. It has always had to be built in. But why does Boeing Management keep repeating this falsehood to Boeing inspectors?--It is one of the chief ways they similarly brainwash their inspectors to not do their jobs and to rollerstamp instead of inspect. As one of my former fellow inspectors noted, when inspectors do not do their jobs, the pushing of garbage quality airplanes out the Boeing factory doors results.
The following crashes of Boeing airplanes are a result of that Boeing Management intentionally subverted quality system at Boeing, with more unfortunately to come.
Rollerstamping Boeing airplane crash example #1:
JAL Flight 123.
Hundreds of people have indeed died because of Boeing's compromised quality system. The exact number will never be known, but the crash of JAL flight 123 is one example. 520 people suffered horribly before they died in the crash of that 747, and only 4 people survived. It is one of the worst crashes of all time. The cause was a Boeing Aircraft On Ground (AOG) crew repair to the pressure dome of the airplane that didn't comply with the Engineering requirements for the repair. While the mechanics that improperly cut the splice plate that was the cause of the crash also bear responsibility, the inspector or inspectors that inspected the repair process in 1978 were responsible as well.
The inspector would have had to verify the material used (which was a piece of the removed pressure dome), as well as the dimensions of the splice plate before installation. It was at that point of inspection that the error of using two pieces instead of one piece for the splice plate should have been first caught. There was at least one other time for the inspector to find the defect: After installation of the splice plate and before fillet seal, and perhaps when the holes were checked before rivet installation, when no sealant would be present and the error would be easily seen. However, it is unclear if a hole diameter check would have been required at the time for such a repair since they were rivet holes. To determine that, the original repair documentation itself would need to be seen, which hasn't been made public, even though it documented the work that caused the crash.
Operations that would have required inspection of the holes before rivet installation, such as cold working of the holes, would be documented on that paperwork and/or the engineering drawing. So, there may have only been two times the defect that caused the crash should have been found by inspection, instead of three.
However, an inspector who actually did their job should have only needed one opportunity to find and document the defect--not three. Was Boeing's endemic rollerstamping fraud in QA in place within that AOG crew? No detailed enough documentation of the investigation exists in order to determine that. Those records are under seal at Boeing and/or the NTSB to protect the privacy of the guilty.
I witnessed first hand that rollerstamping fraud was well embedded throughout Boeing's quality system since at least as far back as 1996, when I first became an inspector at Boeing. Therefore it is not a big leap to extrapolate that the genesis of such almost universal rollerstamping throughout Boeing's quality system had to be many years before that time in order to be spread so widely and uniformly throughout Boeing. AOG is a different organization than normal Boeing factory production. It deals with delivered Boeing airplanes, not in-production airplanes. However, I was transferred as retaliation for inspecting on the Boeing production line to Flight Test QA at Boeing Field in Seattle and I witnessed the rollerstamping "ethic" there among management and inspectors. Those Flight Test inspectors would go on remote assignments, however I don't remember off hand if that was exclusively for inspections on Flight Test airplanes and/or as inspectors on AOG crews.
So, everywhere I've been in Boeing QA has been hobbled by Boeing's rollerstamping QA Management directed "ethic." It's not much of a leap to believe that AOG, whose inspectors are selected from Boeing's rollerstamping Commercial Airplanes production QA crews, also has corrupt Boeing QA Management directed "value adding" rollerstamping inspectors. So, the explanation for how the inspector on the AOG crew bought off the repair work that caused the crash despite having multiple times to have caught the defect during the repair process becomes clear. Being somewhat of an expert on rollerstamping fraud within and without Boeing because I documented it extensively for years, I would say that the most likely way the defect was bought off by the particular inspector at fault was a "courtesy buyoff." This is when inspectors have gotten too close to the mechanics whose work they are supposed to inspect thoroughly and impartially. This would be especially a problem on a small AOG team that spends weeks at a time in luxury hotels in exotic foreign lands, partying together after work with their per diem allowances (essentially on the company/airlines dime). Rollerstamping inspectors all fall victim to this. I saw it for years at Boeing's Propulsion Systems Division (PSD). While a purely rollerstamping inspector will pretty much only pretend to inspect the entire crew's work by doing a cursory shakedown inspection on the particular engine (as I saw other inspectors do many times on the 737 NG Engine Build-Up (EBU) line), instead of the detailed inspection required per drawing, specification, and plan prior to the shakedown inspection, other inspectors are not so "trusting." They will inspect some mechanics' work more than others' work. They do this per their opinion of the particular mechanic they are inspecting the work of that they think they have gained over previous inspections of that mechanic's work. It's still rollerstamping (and illegal) to do this, but some of the "more conscientious" rollerstamping inspectors do this. This can go to extremes, especially when the inspector is a buddy of the particular mechanic. To maintain and enhance the friendship they simply buy off the particular mechanic's work without any inspection at all, or with a cursory glance. This helps develop the friendship bond between the inspector and mechanic, with the inspector showing their friend the ultimate sign of respect--buyoff of their work without inspecting it at all. This particular "rollerstamping ethic" in place in Boeing QA could be exactly what happened during the "inspection" of the AOG mechanic's or mechanics' fateful repair work on JAL 123's rear pressure bulkhead. The mechanic would just ask the inspector, "do you want to verify the material and dimensions on this splice plate before I install and drill it," and the inspector would just answer, "no, that's OK. Just install it. I'll get the paperwork. Then they "rollerstamp" the paperwork, certifying they inspected the operation when they never did.
Will we ever find out who the inspector(s) and mechanic(s) were that were responsible for the repairs so someday they might be asked what really happened? No. Japan for a time went through the steps to try to charge the four Boeing employees involved for negligence in the deaths of the 520, but Boeing obstructed the investigation, so they never were charged. Japan had the names of the four (which have never been made public, which is remarkable in itself), but Boeing would not let them be interviewed by prosecutors in Japan. So no justice there.
What is very significant is that Boeing stated in denying the interviews that they didn't think the four Boeing employees had committed a crime. This, although somewhat cryptic as to what it meant, does give some important clues. The repair that Boeing did that caused the crash would be defined by anyone who spent any time as part of Manufacturing or QA at Boeing as "illegal rework." That is Boeing terminology for unauthorized work done on the airplane in the Boeing production system. It is pretty much the same as sabotage. And, it is a crime here in the U.S. The noted Boeing repair fits the definition of illegal rework if the mechanics did it and tried to hide it from detection by QA. In that instance, Boeing would have allowed the mechanics to be charged with that crime, unless they had some ulterior motive not to allow that. But, taking Boeing at their word to Japan and the press, their investigation of the four employees' (who were probably a combination of the mechanics and inspectors responsible as shown on the repair paperwork) actions during the repair found no evidence of such illegal rework. That means that the inspector of the repair must have covered for the mechanics, convincing Boeing that the mechanics did not perform the illegal rework it would be without the inspector's approval, perhaps convincing Boeing that the four simply made an honest mistake during the repair and inspection of that work.
Of course, another huge possibility as to why Boeing didn't consider what the four employees did during the illegal rework that caused the crash as a crime is "the elephant in the room." While Boeing won't let us or JAL know the actual facts because that would uncover just how corrupt the Boeing production system is as documented here, evidence from someone "in the know" points out three of the four Boeing employees were two mechanics and one inspector. While not overtly pointing it out, the identity of the fourth person was almost certainly a Boeing manager that was involved in the repair. That would give Boeing an even bigger incentive to prevent law enforcement from interviewing them. That would expose the same corruption that is documented here was behind the crash--corrupt Boeing management directing the lower level "peon" employees to "make it fit" by cutting the splice plate into two pieces and convincing the inspector to buy it off that way "to get the job done" under cost and on schedule, no matter how much quality and safety had to be undercut to do it.
In Boeing's twisted view, none of the employees could be allowed to be held criminally accountable, for that would only end up indicting the Boeing manager(s) involved of 520 counts of involuntary manslaughter. And nothing could be more dangerous to Boeing Management than that for a couple reasons. Firstly, because Boeing Management relies on committing fraud all of the time to meet stock price goals as documented on this website. And, secondly, having any Boeing manager held criminally accountable for hundreds of deaths from a crash because they directed inspection to buy off discrepant work would have endangered the continuance of those crimes throughout Boeing and its supplier base. Boeing managers would suddenly be unwilling to continue to ensure such rollerstamping if they knew doing so would result in them doing prison time. Even the upper middle class lives they were given by Boeing for engaging in such fraud wouldn't be enough to make them take that risk, no matter if the vast majority of the hundreds or thousands of defects they ensured were delivered on every Boeing airplane wouldn't cause the airplane to crash.
So, such personal accountability for the crimes of Boeing production management would massively "destroy the value" of the rollerstamping fraud they had carefully husbanded over the years, and prevent their planned continuance and expansion of it in the future. While the lowly Boeing manager only gained a Lexus over a Honda Civic by such fraud, for Boeing Executive Management, they were talking about a Rolls Royce instead of a Mercedes, or a Lamborghini Aventador over a lowly high end Porsche they thought they would lose by ending this fraud.
So, in addition to paying JAL off and preventing Japanese prosecutors from interviewing the four, Boeing even went so far as to revise its entire production and maintenance paperwork process, preventing Boeing employees from putting their names on the paperwork again. Alphanumeric codes for an employee were used instead. Only in that way could Boeing assure its management that it would go the distance in doing everything they could to prevent them from ever having any consequences for engaging in such fraud. And thereby, they ensured its continuance to this day.
That is the only interpretation that makes sense considering the facts. The NTSB's investigation found that the Engineering definition of the repair was not responsible. Therefore the responsibility had to be those who did the repair and inspected it, with the inclusion of their management. In any event, the reason for the crash is clear--chalk up 520 bodies to Boeing QA rollerstamping.
Even though systemic fraud in Boeing Management was the cause, you have to wonder how the inspector, the two mechanics, and the Boeing Manager lived with themselves after the crash, knowing their complicity in that fraud caused the horrific deaths of 520 people. A Japan Air Lines maintenance official that could not have been involved in the crime responsible for the crash committed suicide just over a month after the crash. But as far as I know, none of the four Boeing employees involved have done so. They would probably be retired now, in their mid sixties or so. How could they have enjoyed their lives after they knew they were responsible? If suicide was ever to have a good reason, you would think it would apply to the four involved if they did so. This is where Japanese culture is not all bad. The noted official shouldn't have committed suicide as there was no way they could have known what the four Boeing employees did at the point in the process their approval of the repair might have come in. But if there ever was any justifiable reason for the Japanese cultural tradition of Hara-Kiri, being responsible for the deaths of 520 innocent people would seem to be it. A Japanese official committing Hara-Kiri for not meeting the quarterly production goals would be stupid and tragic, but I think even most non-Japanese people could understand if one or more of the four Boeing employees did so.
Perhaps it is this culture of non-accountability in America that allows so many Boeing employees to commit the massive fraud documented on this website and then go home and play with the kids, even if something they were required to do but didn't do during their work killed many people. Boeing Management endorses and covers for this culture of fraud as noted. I don't believe this is the positive Boeing Management and Boeing non-management employees engaged in it believe it is by far, even if it brings the stock price up even 10%. In fact, I believe it is the serious crime it is on paper.
Perhaps the four haven't held themselves accountable for their manslaughter due to some twisted religious belief that allows them to escape such accountability. But even if they don't hold themselves accountable, they should be named publicly at a minimum, over Boeing's objections. The families of the dead still couldn't get accountability from them that way, but at least they could troll them on Twitter for the rest of their lives if they wanted to do so because of that, which just may be a therapeutic outlet for their grief.
Is the above characterization of Boeing's responsibility for the crash an unfair deduction? Hardly. This is based upon my extensive experience at Boeing within their corrupt quality system, constantly being pressured by Boeing Management to only pretend to inspect the airplane. I am just giving my honest and informed assessment, as opposed to some of Boeing's past crash assessments against the data in hand at the time, which proved to be false. Such was the case with Boeing attempting to blame the rudder hardovers and resulting crashes of Flight 427 and Flight 585 on the pilots of those doomed flights.
Rollerstamping Boeing airplane crash example #2:
TWA Flight 800.
On July 17, 1996, 12 minutes after takeoff from New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport on a scheduled international passenger flight to Rome, Trans World Airlines Flight 800, a Boeing 747, exploded and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean near East Moriches, New York. All 230 people on board were killed in the third-deadliest aviation accident in U.S. territory.
The four-year NTSB investigation concluded on August 23, 2000 with a report that the probable cause of the accident was an explosion of flammable fuel/air vapors in the center wing fuel tank, and the most likely cause of that explosion was a short circuit in the 747's wiring system outside of the center wing fuel tank that allowed excessive voltage to enter it through electrical wiring associated with the fuel quantity indication system.
From page 189 of the report:
"Further, investigators identified several instances in which the wires and/or wire bundle routing, clamping, and/or tension in various series 747 airplanes did not appear to be in accordance with Boeing's 747 (maintenance) manuals or PIs (Production Illustrations--the engineering drawings that the wire bundles are required to be installed to). For example, in some airplanes, parallel small wire bundles were tied into larger wire bundles differently than shown in the PIs. Additionally, in some airplanes, wires were stretched tightly between clamps and rubbed/chafed against clamps, other brackets, and around bends. This rubbing/chafing often resulted in abraded wire insulation. In one airplane, three blackened rub marks were found on two wire bundles. In one 747, a set of twisted wires in a woven jacket (similar to that used for Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS) wires) had chafed through the jacket, wire topcoat, and into the base of the insulation. Further, in other inspected airplanes, wires/wire bundles that were supposed to be segregated in separate parallel bundles (according to Boeing 747 PIs) were in contact with each other."
From page 191 of the report:
"In one airplane (its last known flight was in January 1997), wires in the raceway over the Center Wing Tank (CWT) were not bundled (as indicated by Boeing's PIs) but were randomly laid in a tray, such that individual wires crossed from one side of the tray to the other. Higher-voltage generator and galley power cables were clamped to the adjacent structure (not routed in the tray). Inspection of the inside of this airplane's CWT revealed the following: the scavenge pump inlet screen contained a nearly 1-inch-long uninsulated wire fragment, a vertically routed FQIS wire was chafed where it contacted a horizontal structural flange, and a horizontally routed FQIS wire was chafed where it contacted a vertical row of rivets between two supporting clamps. Examination of this airplane's CWT fuel quantity probes by the AFRL experts revealed sulfide deposits on the bare wire ends and terminal sleeves, and some of the wires were loose under the clamps; two of the wires exhibited striation marks that resembled jaw marks of a wire stripping tool."
From page 281 of the report:
In addition, Safety Board examinations of other transport-category airplanes, including several 747s, found that high-voltage wires can be co-routed with FQIS wires in ways that do not comply with the manufacturer's production illustrations (PI) and/or are not consistent with the guidance in Boeing's Standard Wiring Practices Manual (SWPM). These noncompliant wiring configurations can be installed at the time of manufacture or during subsequent maintenance activities.
The investigation found that damaged and/or contaminated wire insulation is widespread in older transport-category airplanes and also exists in new airplanes. Specifically, Safety Board examinations of wiring on 26 airplanes of varying ages (ranging from new to 28 years old) revealed that all of the older airplanes exhibited numerous examples of mechanically damaged, chafed, cracked, and contaminated wires. The examinations also found sharp-edged metal drill shavings (which can damage wire insulation), fluid stains, and other potentially hazardous material in or near the aircraft wiring of old and new airplanes."
So, the accident report details what is the most likely cause of the crash--installation errors and FOD (foreign Object Damage--in this case metallic drill shavings) that were allowed by Boeing's rollerstamping quality system to exist on Boeing airplanes as delivered to airlines. Inspectors just bought off the wiring installations with only a cursory glance at them, if that, not doing their jobs of detecting the defects in the installations and ensuring they were corrected before delivery. In this case, this Boeing Management corrupted system cost 230 people their lives.
The NTSB is not protective like the FAA is of this Boeing Management ensured fraud. They actually reveal the massively and consistently discrepant nature of the work of Boeing inspectors at Boeing Management direction in ignoring defects--something that the captured FAA would never do in such detail in a public report for fear of angering their desired post-retirement employer.
The discrepancies from the drawing required condition of the wire bundle installations of delivered airplanes that were allowed by Boeing rollerstamping inspectors as noted in the NTSB report sections above are representative of the hundreds or even thousands of defects thusly intentionally delivered in the wire bundle installations of every Boeing airplane delivered.
These intentionally delivered wire bundle installation defects by the noted fraud are perhaps only exceeded in number on each Boeing airplane by fastener installation discrepancies. So, if you are inclined to fly on Boeing airplanes you can "rest easy" that most of the thousands of defects Boeing intentionally ensured are in the Boeing airplane you are on are in the following areas: The entire electrical system of the airplane and in the realm of every fastener installation holding its structure and systems together. Boeing Management is an equal opportunity defect ensurer--every fastener and wire bundle system on each airplane is eligible to be noncompliant due to the rollerstamping inspection fraud they ensure happens. While many intentionally overlooked defects exist on every Boeing airplane of a model, many are just like Forest Gump described of a box chocolates--"you never know what you are going to get." This is one of the more scary things about Boeing's rollerstamping fraud. Due to it's mostly random nature, it is impossible to predict the number or severity of the defects in any individual Boeing airplane delivered. You are literally risking your life like you risk your money at the casino--hoping that the airplane you are on doesn't have a defect on it that is so severe that it will result in your injury or death, as happened to 750 others on JAL 123 or TWA 800.
And that is what is also so sad about this Boeing/FAA Management corruption. In 2016 and decades prior, the public expects that the quality assurance of Boeing airplanes is scientifically ensured in reality to the minimum required level. They think that the FAA has independently confirmed that. Not true, however. Corrupt FAA Management only ensures what corrupt Boeing Management wants them to ensure, which is pretty much nothing. And due to this, the minimum required quality and safety of each Boeing airplane is never assured as required, and therefore the level of safety of each Boeing airplane is left to random chance, rather than ensured to the minimally required level.
This Boeing Management fraud that brought down TWA 800 in this instance I witnessed first hand as detailed in my first report of this systemic Boeing QA Management fraud that I submitted to the FAA on January 12th, 2002, where I wrote about a chilling meeting I had with my QA Supervisor of the time, Tom Nakamichi:
'Since we hadn‘t discussed that day until then, I explained what happened that day. I told him (Nakamichi) that the reason (the Manufacturing supervisor) had probably called him was because I had done the wire bundle inspection before the shakedown, as was my habit (as I knew per inspection procedure that all workable jobs had to be completed prior to shakedowns), even though other inspectors would inspect the wire bundle job during the shakedown to save time. I told him that the whole event could have been avoided if (the Manufacturing supervisor) had communicated with me. I told him that (the Manufacturing Supervisor) would not speak to me. I said that none of the Mfg supervisors would talk with me if they had a problem, instead they would go directly to the QA Leads or Supervisor. He said that “Gerry, the shop supervisors won’t talk to you because they know they won’t get what they want.”
He asked me how long it took me to inspect the wire bundle. I said I didn’t time myself, but I guessed about an hour. He questioned the time. I told him that the wire bundle job was the largest job on the engine, and I told him how I inspected wire bundle jobs, how I inspected for loose clamps, damage from installation, gapped clamp cushions, breakouts riding the main bundle, loose ties, etc. Then I would get the drawings and check for clamp lobing, missing clamps, any other installation notes that I did not know about that installation. He asked why I looked for loose ties, as they were done at the vendor. I said no, that in pre-assembly and on installation, the shop adds ties to the bundle. He questioned my use of drawings, stating that all our installations are common across models and that I should be able to inspect without referring to them. He said that a clamp on one engine model is installed the same way on all engine models.
He asked if I knew that, if the nut fell off, that each clamp was designed to stay in place. I said no. He asked if I knew that the engine would run without the wire bundle. I said no. I said “You can think of a million reasons not to do your job, but only one reason to do the job--integrity....(I had thought that line up a long time ago in response to the many instances when I saw inspectors or QA supervisors similarly spout reasons to justify not doing their jobs, and then stamping the job saying they did the job, and this was the first time I got to use that, hopefully original, line). He stared poker-faced at me. He asked me how many planes have crashed due to an EBU (Engine Build-Up) problem. I thought for a few moments and said “at least one.” He didn’t ask which crash I was thinking of. He asked me what I thought my job as an inspector was. “To inspect”, I said. He said, “No, it is to train mechanics.” He said inspectors were the expert mechanics. Strange, I thought, because some inspectors have never been mechanics, and I had seen the word “inspect” quite often in the QA manual, but I didn’t remember the word “train” once. As weird and off-the-wall as this message sounded to me, I had heard this very same message from another of my old QA supervisors, whose eerily similar message I will describe later. I said I did not consider my job as an inspector as optional, even if other inspectors did.'
That is the explicit direction I got from my Boeing manager to ignore engineering drawings and not to inspect wire bundles at all, under the ludicrous assertion that I was to train mechanics and not assure quality of the airplane, and that the engine could still run without the wire bundle.
Yes, crooks like my noted Boeing manager will stoop to unbelievable lengths in order to brainwash Boeing inspectors into not inspecting the airplane as required. In this case, it was about not inspecting the wire bundle installation defects like those that brought down TWA 800. And things only have gotten worse since then. Nakamichi has been promoted several times since then, and still thusly subverts Boeing airplane quality, albeit at a much higher Boeing Management level now. I reported in detail this and other attempts by Nakamichi to coerce me and other inspectors into not inspecting Boeing jet engines and the struts that held them to the wing to Doug Bain, Boeing's Chief Counsel at Corporate Headquarters in Chicago in 2002 and 2003. Boeing's Chief Counsel didn't think I was just a gnat on the ass of Boeing when I first contacted him in 2002. He immediately put his own thousands of dollars per hour ass on a corporate jet and sped over to my workplace to handle the threat of my going to the FAA himself.
At an ethical company, Bain would have had Nakamichi fired and law enforcement notified to investigate such coercion to get FAA inspector designees like me to commit a crime. But Boeing isn't an ethical company.
Instead, Boeing's Chief Counsel ensured that no such investigation occurred, I was retaliated against further, and Nakamichi was rewarded for keeping Boeing Management's systemic coercion of inspectors not to inspect to himself for greater bottom line rewards.
I could go on and on about specific instances of such subversion of wire bundle installation inspections at Boeing's Propulsion Systems Division (PSD) and Boeing's Everett plant, but I'll stop here for brevity and to keep readers' gut wrenching in response to this reality to a minimum (PSD was later incorporated into Boeing's Everett and Renton plants).
So, as the NTSB wrote, the most likely cause of the TWA 800 explosion of its Center Wing Tank in flight was a defect in a defect riddled (as proven by the NTSB in the report) 747 wire bundle installation that caused a short circuit that transferred electrical energy to the FQIS system in the CWT. The specific manufacturing defect at fault for the explosion could have been one or more of several kinds of defects that are delivered on every Boeing airplane model, not just 747s. Misrouted wire bundles, riding conditions, metallic shavings, wires pinched in clamps, damaged wire insulation, insufficient clearances, mislocated clamps, wrong size clamps, insufficient wire bundle buildup in clamps, etc. Many defects that don't cause a problem when the Boeing airplane is delivered can become critical defects as the years pass when the airplane is in service. For instance, clearance issues. Two wire bundles may have rubbed against each other 30,000 times, but then comes the instant when conductors finally touch due to the abrasion, and things like TWA 800 occur.
Because so many of each kind of possible wire bundle installation defect delivers on Boeing airplanes, the list of candidates for the exact production defect that caused TWA 800 to explode is large. And per the NTSB report parlance, the likelihood of a defect causing the crash is greater with the number such defects in the real world. If there is one thing most consistent about Boeing airplanes, it is the thousands of delivered defects on every Boeing airplane. That one of those defects caused a crash was just a matter of time. Boeing Management has been lucky more of the defects they ensure deliver on every Boeing airplane haven't been such "killer" defects so far. But time is not on their side. The risk to passengers and crew on Boeing airplanes will only increase as time goes on, and will only be eliminated when those Boeing airplanes are taken out of service.
So, there you have it, Boeing rollerstamping crash #2, adding 230 more deaths from rollerstamping at Boeing, bringing the minimum total up to 750 deaths. As noted earlier, this is a small subset of the actual deaths from these Boeing Management criminal actions. Boeing routinely and wrongly tries to blame crashes of Boeing airplanes on the pilots, even though Boeing was responsible, as in the case of United Airlines Flight 585 and USAir's Flight 427 (both 737s), where Boeing lied that the rudder system was safe in order to try to save the money that fixing the defective rudder system would cost. Boeing Management is nothing if not consistently unethical. Given the choice of doing the right thing or doing the thing that will bump up the stock price, Boeing Management will almost invariably choose the stock price bump action.
Also preventing the true cause of these crashes from being found, in many cases the missing and damaged parts of the crashed Boeing airplanes prevent identifying the precise and exact cause of a crash, whether it is Boeing Management's intentional subversion of their quality system as noted here, or some other cause.
Check back often. I'm going to add more crashes that Boeing QA Management fraud is responsible for here as I get time to document them. Thankfully for the lives of people, this intentional crime by Boeing doesn't often result in such death. You are most likely to see it only when your flight is delayed for "mechanical reasons," brought to you by this same Boeing Management fraud.