As sadly noted in the title above, the Second to Last (Boeing) Inspector is dead.
I have been going through my email as I occasionally do and reaching out to people that have contacted me through this website that I haven't heard from in a while.
One Boeing inspector I had communicated with was the self named "Second (to) Last Inspector." My email to him bounced back as undeliverable. I googled him to see if I could reach him in another way, thinking he changed his email address. Sadly, I found his obituary instead. The Second to Last Inspector had died. One less good guy in the inspection ranks at Boeing, I thought. What little is left of Boeing's quality system took another hit. Not to mention a good man of the community gone as well, with so many deplorable people still amongst us today. Both Boeing and America had lost a force for good. Sad.
In honor of this good man and patriot, I wanted to share the first email he sent me, minus identifying info of course:
email subject line: "thesecondlastinspector"
(Name) here. I started in 19XX as a QA inspector in Everett on the 747.
Spent XX 1/2 years there, then got laid off in 20XX. X years as a Union Steward there. Then called back to Renton 737 wings X years ago. Prior to that worked as a (Industry) Inspector at (city), (state).
I presently work 737 wing laydown in Renton as QA, and once again as a Union Steward. I see and live what you talk about everyday.
I learned to collect the Union Steward role for the area I'm working in long long ago, for the simple fact if you do your job like we are supposed to do you'll be "moved". Hell, it happened here to a lady inspector who was hanging "too much tape" just two weeks ago.
I'm a total asshole to Boeing management when it comes to Quality by the book. And yes, as you well know, that always comes at a price at Boeing. But having the Steward badge makes it so they can't just "move me along." I am a very happy thorn in their ass and I love it.
(Deleted identifier)...have a few really current and very deceitful practices they do to this day.
Well must go to work but would be glad to talk more if your interested. Have a good day...(name)."
As you can see, The Second to Last Inspector experienced the same fraud by Boeing QA and Manufacturing management (no difference at Boeing, as there is supposed to be per FAA requirements) that I did.
He became a Union Steward so he wouldn't be bounced around like I was and the woman he noted was for actually inspecting the airplane before buying off the job (less items found).
Yep, at Boeing "hanging too much tape" as an inspector is an offense that will get you transferred to a makework job, to another location, or even fired. Inspectors at Boeing identify defects with narrow blue painter's tape like you use when you mask for painting at home. This identifies the specific location of the defect the inspector found during the inspection, usually noting the defect ("Short Hi-Lok," for example) and/or nonconformance record item number the inspector writes that the defect corresponds to.
So, "hanging tape" simply means an inspector is documenting the defects they find during their inspection of the job/process that a mechanic put up for final/process inspection. It's a good thing to find and document defects on airplanes, except at Boeing. As The Second to Last Inspector noted, "hanging too much tape" (documenting defects instead of letting them deliver to the airline or government customer as is) as an inspector can bring you the unwelcome attention of the typical corrupt Boeing QA Supervisor.
In a healthy and functioning quality system, an inspector would be rewarded for "hanging tape" (finding defects during an inspection) by their management. Not so in Boeing's largely corrupt quality system.
"Hanging too much tape" (finding some/all defects during an inspection instead of buying off the defective work as OK on the production record after a very cursory or "pretend" non-inspection) can get you retaliated against by your corrupt Boeing QA Supervisor as noted. This retaliation can be very severe, and result in you being sent from the location you committed the offense (to corrupt Boeing management) of actually inspecting the work put up for inspection, to a much worse and less desirable location, such as being transferred from Final Assembly, where you don't have to crawl through confined spaces and there is little to no constant noisy/jarring riveting, to the relative "pit of Hell" inspection area of the Wing Majors, where there are cramped spaces and almost constant drilling/riveting. And such less desirable locations to work as an inspector as the Wing Majors are Hell for inspectors who actually inspect the work they buy off, as the typical rollerstamping inspector just has to buy off the production record falsely stating they inspected the work and found it acceptable, whereas a non-rollerstamping inspector has to inspect all of the work done on the job, even in extremely tough to inspect areas, and "hang tape" and document the defects they find.
As noted elsewhere on this site and in my report to the FAA, I was retaliated against several times over my almost 10 year career as a Boeing QA Inspector for the "crime" (to corrupt Boeing QA management) of actually doing my job of inspecting, rather than just falsifying paperwork as rollerstamping Boeing inspectors do.
The first time my QA management retaliated against me for inspecting was my first day, I believe, as an inspector, as I noted in this Daily (to the FAA) Report Quote:
'I don’t remember if it was my first day as a Body Structures inspector, or not, but I believe it was close to my first day. I had logged in on a "job complete" inspection on the (electronic) call sheet...on a skin lap job on a body structure section. This job was huge. There were, I think, several hundreds or even thousands of rivets (mostly) on this major job. I believe there were some Hi-Loks on the job. I knew Hi-Loks well, as I had installed many of them myself, but rivets were another story.
I knew very little about solid rivet installation, and that was pretty much all this job did. I pulled all of the drawings for the job, and went through the plan. I read the specifications I didn’t know that had to do with the job. I went to the tool room to get the correct rivet gages in case I needed them, which I hoped I didn‘t. After all, these were probably very experienced structure mechanics (certainly more experienced at their jobs than I was at mine at that point) that had done the job, and I would just be able to eyeball all of these rivets with my "calibrated eyes" as they all would likely be installed correctly. I went out with my drawings and blank pickup forms and began to inspect the skin lap job.
I couldn’t believe all of the defects that I found on that job! Oh well, I thought, I had to do my job regardless of the number or extent of defects, as I was taught in class, for the most part, so I documented everything I found. At the end of the inspection I had several pages of pickup items written on the one job. I don’t remember the exact number of pages, but it seemed to be a huge amount to me, the new inspector. I hoped that that job was an aberration, and the number of pickup items was only due to the workmanship of the mechanics involved, and I would not have to write so many pickups on every similar sized job all of the time if more skilled mechanics had done the work. I was glad my QA manager obviously knew I was new at this so that they would allow me the extra time that it had taken me to document those defects than it would take a more experienced inspector that had inspected that job before.
I believe it was the next day when I got a transfer notice that I was being reassigned to the 777 Wing Stub Body Join area.'
End of report quote.
I had "hung a lot of tape" on that job, so my corrupt QA management had to get rid of me. As noted, I was sent to the 777 Wing Stub Body Join area, where I had to crawl into the 777 Wing Stub to inspect, a much harder area to inspect than the open 777 Body Structures. I eventually was banned from inspecting in the 777 Wing Stub, also for the "crime" (to corrupt Boeing QA management) of "hanging too much tape" on defective fasteners, holes, and structural damage in the Wing Stub area. Corrupt Boeing QA management couldn't have me there as I documented too much damage inside the Wing Stub one day, which takes a lot of rework, as almost all rework to critical wing structure there requires flap peen work after blending, which takes time for both mechanics and inspectors to perform their roles, after Engineering disposition. Corrupt QA management assigned me outboard of that area, so that such bad holes, bad fasteners/bolts, and structural damage to the Wing Stub Body Join structure could deliver to airline customers instead of possibly delaying a Line Move by taking time for QA to document the defects, Engineering to disposition the defects if required, mechanics to fix those defects, and inspect that rework/repair. Makes you wonder why a 777 hasn't broken up in flight yet, doesn't it?
And that's the chief reason corrupt Boeing management ensures this QA fraud--the QA "rework/repair loops" in the production process are totally omitted through such fraud, cutting cost and production flow time, when a Boeing QA manager ensures that those defects are never documented in the first place by ensuring that one of their "groomed" rollerstamping Boeing QA inspectors falsifies the production record stated the work was inspected and acceptable when neither was true.
Another contributor to my transfer from that area was that I was probably the only inspector who wrote up shanked out/too long bolts that attached the wing stub to the wings and bulkheads. And these were the biggest bolts in those critical structural joins--some of the largest bolts in the entire 777. See, no matter how critical or large the defect is, "hanging too much tape" (finding too many defects when inspecting) will get you retaliated against by corrupt QA management, as The Second to Last Inspector noted above.
I wonder where that lady inspector from 737 Wing Laydown who "hung too much tape" (actually did her job) got transferred to by her corrupt Renton QA management, as The Second to Last Inspector noted.
I never took delight in doing my job over the objections of my corrupt Boeing QA management as The Second to Last Inspector obviously did. Nothing wrong with being happy about making evil people like corrupt Boeing QA Management angry when doing your job over their illegal pressure on you not to, I guess. But that was never a motivation for me. I only did my job well over the wishes of my corrupt Boeing QA management because I knew of the importance of my job to everyone on or under the Boeing airplanes I inspected, and our critical roles as designees of the FAA. I took no pleasure in "hanging too much tape." Doing so only put a target on my back for corrupt Boeing management and bad mechanics to "shoot at." I never looked forward to being retaliated against because a mechanic made too many mistakes. But I had to do my job regardless. I was born with something alien to many Boeing employees and almost all Boeing managers--ethics.
Yes, dear departed Second to Last Inspector, us inspectors doing our jobs per the FAA approved Boeing quality system "book" of procedures always comes at a personal price at Boeing. But good inspectors like us do it, regardless of the price corrupt Boeing management makes us pay.
As Usual, Yet Another Defect Riddled Boeing Airplane Model, the 777X, Begins Production, and Corrupt Boeing Management Endangers Your Safety Ever Further
I have been on a break from this space to get some other projects done, so this post will likely be a long read.
Last week came the much hyped (in yet another transparent PR effort to drum up the 10X overvalued stock price) start of the assembly of the first production model 777X at Boeing's Everett factory where all Boeing twin aisle airplane models are almost built, less the Old Confederacy almost built 787s coming out of their South Carolina union avoidance factory.
This was nothing to celebrate by anyone in the know about the massive fraud that goes into the production of every Boeing airplane almost produced. In fact, it was the most macabre event in the week running up to Halloween, a slap in whatever is left of the face of every flier and crew member manslaughtered by the massive Boeing management directed (and Boeing Legal protected) QA fraud documented on this site.
It is that Boeing management directed QA fraud that enables much of the low cost and fast production flow of each Boeing plane almost produced then delivered fraudulently as a complete airplane. At last count (by no means comprehensive), at least 750 people were manslaughtered by corrupt Boeing management/Boeing Legal in Boeing's constant pursuit of delivering the least quality, most unsafe airplanes in commercial and military airplane markets.
Macabre indeed. And those 750 died very tortuous deaths at the fraud of Boeing management, many dying of exposure after hours of lying horribly wounded in the rough mountainous terrain of Japan after barely surviving the terrifying Boeing QA/management fraud caused death spiral of JAL's Flight 123. Many on Boeing QA fraud doomed TWA Flight 800 died equally tortuous deaths, likely falling separately sans parachute or riding the wreckage 13,700 feet or so down to their deaths on impact with the ocean. What caused their deaths? The center wing tank of the almost built (as Boeing delivered it) 747 they were flying on blew up due to a Boeing QA fraud overlooked wiring defect that shorted out with the critical Fuel Quantity Indicating System wiring to the tank.
I only bring this up in such detail because the corrupt Boeing management whose fraud caused those 750 deaths never think about them (as proven by their continued subversion to this day of Boeing's QA system that has placed millions more at risk of such gruesome deaths just to try to get Boeing stock further multiple times overvalued), and they deserve remembrance somewhere.
As noted, the ethics free Boeing PR produced event was something to mourn, not something to celebrate. As noted here in detail somewhat often, only Boeing going out of business or being sold to another company with ethical management can protect the world's flying public and airline and military crews from the Boeing QA/Boeing Executive/Boeing Legal directed/protected fraud documented on this site, and the start of any new Boeing airplane's production doesn't support that happening. Just the opposite.
I have proven that Boeing's FAA will never acknowledge or do anything to end this massive Boeing QA fraud that has already cost hundreds of lives as noted. Key corrupt FAA managers currently/once in Boeing's pocket like FAA Associate Administrator to Debase Aviation Safety Ali Bahrami will never allow Boeing management's rampant fraud against their undeservedly delegated FAA approved quality system to end.
It was unindicted corrupt Boeing management co-conspirator Associate Administrator to Debase Aviation Safety Bahrami who played a key role in killing the investigation of my 2002 report of enterprise-wide Boeing QA management fraud without any investigation of the eminently and transparently corrupt Boeing QA management whose fraud my report documented. He also, as a bonus to Boeing, helped kill the investigation of the 381 items in my 387 page report to the FAA that proved that Boeing QA management always does the exact opposite of their FAA required duties of ensuring Boeing QA system compliance with FAA requirements.
(FAA Administrator to Debase Aviation Safety Bahrami even killed my report of a Boeing supplier's Boeing intentionally ignored fraud that I witnessed as an inspector there as a further bonus to similarly corrupt Boeing management.)
Sadly, as is shown almost daily on the non Faux/Brietbart news, corruption in the Trump administration is a feature, and not a bug. That's likely why Bahrami was hired back to the FAA from his position as a Boeing funded lobbyist for the worst changes that Boeing wanted Congress to do to further hobble the FAA's theoretical oversight of Boeing's almost wholly corrupt QA and other management.
In Bahrami's defense, if he wasn't cashing in by keeping Boeing's QA fraud ongoing and safe, another equally ethic bereft FAA manager would be in his place doing so. So, in his likely historically supported view, he may as well be the one to cash in via such felonious RICO-like activity. So, as the corrupt con man led Trump Administration loots the nation's treasury, someone as unethical as Bahrami would be stupid not to join in in effect and get his own bag of illicit quid pro quo cash too, even if he has to wait to actually get it, like the last time he cashed in.
Enough about the long history of continuing FAA/Boeing corruption.
As noted, each new Boeing airplane model, like the 787, or each derivative, like the 777X, or each new Boeing airplane of any model that starts production at Boeing, further corrupts and helps eliminate Boeing's largely wholly corrupt quality and safety assurance system.
Each Boeing airplane model derivative like the 777X ushers in huge new compromises in the effectiveness of Boeing's corrupt quality/safety assurance system. Much more so than quality and safety are further compromised with each new line number airplane Boeing almost builds by corrupt QA supervisors ensuring their inspectors never actually inspect the airplane before they buy off the work as conforming to quality and engineering safety requirements.
(As frequent visitors to this site know, it was my corrupt Boeing QA supervisor trying to get me to train mechanics rather than inspect anything before I bought it off that was the impetus for me to finally go to the FAA. I later reported him to the Chief Counsel of Boeing Legal, who ensured he was promoted instead of fired and/or reported to the FBI. As you can see, corrupting QA, engineering, or other FAA delegates at Boeing will get you promoted rather than put in a Federal Penitentiary where you belong. Only opposing corrupt Boeing/Boeing Legal management will get you prosecuted by Boeing.)
New airplane models, like the 787, enact even more massive quality and safety compromising omissions/subversions of Boeing management's hated and constantly further corrupted quality/safety assurance system.
A good example of this is exactly the noted funeral for yet more of Boeing's quality/safety assurance system, the start of 777X production produced by Boeing's fake news, lying PR "stock price fluffer" department:
The above is the prime moment from the 777X production start (and increase the price of the massively overpriced stock) ceremony. Narrated by Boeing stock price fluffer and VP of 777/777X Jason Clark, the above robot drills a hole, sucks out the chips, and installs the first fastener on a 777X spar/stiffener assembly. What's missing? Right, anyone or anything measuring the hole size or quality before the fastener is installed, forever preventing such inspection. The GeekWire page pictured above about the ceremony notes only that the hole was drilled and then a fastener immediately installed in the hole in the caption under the picture. While there may be a possibility the robot also measured the size and quality of the hole before fastener installation, Boeing VP and stock price fluffer Clark never said so. I think more likely would be the case that Boeing would fabricate the production record that states the hole's diameter and quality were checked and were OK rather than corrupt Boeing management telling a hypothetically inquisitive press that asked about this omission that the hole was never actually inspected. After all, most Boeing QA records are falsified, probably to even a greater extent than Boeing Suppliers Kobe Steel's and Moog Aerospace's were fabricated. After all, in my experience, due to corrupt Boeing QA manager pressure, there is no more common trait among Boeing inspectors than rollerstamping to get the job bought off in time with minimal/no required levels of inspection.
Such is the conundrum for the press that cares about the truth. What, if anything, can you believe coming from the management or PR department of the most corrupt large company on the planet?
It would seem that Boeing would want the public to know that, even though inspectors who used to inspect such holes are no longer part of the process, that at least the robot was still performing that function.
But maybe Boeing is trying to get the public to get quality and safety out of their minds when thinking about the airplanes Boeing almost builds, just like Boeing's corrupt QA managers and Quality Engineers (if there are any still at Boeing) do. Those positions at Boeing actually keep quality and safety from happening in the production process in my experience. The exact opposite of what their jobs are supposed to be.
Anyway, this is just an example of how the quality and safety of Boeing airplanes are inexorably lowered with each new airplane, derivative, or new model they almost build. The fact that Boeing is using these robots to perform their favorite bottom line enhancing tactic--further subverting the quality and safety of each plane Boeing almost builds--is obvious as noted, even in very carefully staged PR/Investor Relations events like these.
Hole inspections are omitted more and more at Boeing during introduction of these robots for one overriding reason by corrupt Boeing management--greed. I've seen articles/videos about 787 use of automation that also show automated equipment drilling holes and then immediately installing fasteners. Even non-close tolerance holes at least require random sampling inspection. Close tolerance holes require 100% inspection or a sampling inspection approved by a likely corrupt Boeing Quality Engineer. At least that was the case when I was an inspector at Boeing. QA procedures likely have been corrupted since then, however, to omit formerly required inspections when Boeing's QA/engineering systems were less corrupt.
The 787 was also a huge step down in quality and safety assurance at Boeing. My corrupt QA General Manager at Boeing's Propulsion Systems Division was promoted to Sonic Cruiser quality manager, and then became 787 Quality manager. As I remember, one of the key quality subversion goals he had was to ensure that no supplier 787 components, no matter how big (wings/entire sections), were ever inspected on receival at Boeing. Instead, I believe he was working on some process that allowed QA inspectors to buy off entire 787 sections/wings without any Boeing quality/conformity inspection of ANY of the massive quantity of work the supplier had almost done on that section. I believe this was called "Condition of Assembly" Boeing receival inspection. I suspect that is why the wings and sections came wrapped in plastic. I guess if the wrapping wasn't damaged, that some Boeing inspector rollerstamped that entire section and all the work that was done on/in it as acceptable per Boeing's (rarely done in my and the FAA's experience) supplier QA system oversight responsibilities.
I have very little actual experience with 787 QA work, only having seen fraud in that QA work at a Boeing supplier. I have not much other knowledge of 787 QA system subversion other than what my former QA General Manager did as noted. As I remember, Boeing had special sub-optimized QA system and other procedures just for the 787 program. But I cannot claim to know just how deeply corrupt Boeing QA management subverted QA for cost and flow efficiencies on the 787 program. The truth could well be more horrifying than what little I witnessed.
Every time such a quality or safety or any other process can be omitted entirely or lessened, more money flows to Boeing's bottom line in the view of corrupt Boeing management. And to them, that makes Boeing's balance sheet look better, which makes the value of stock options (that form a significant portion of their compensation) increase. Boeing management is reducing your safety and increasing your risk of being on the next JAL123 or TWA800 like Boeing almost built flying rollercoaster of torture and death every day, every derivative, and every new airplane model for only one reason: Greed.
I may add links in the future as information becomes available, but a huge example of Boeing (and/or McDonnell Douglas--now the same corrupt company) making changes that massively decrease your margin of safety (literally) when flying is when Boeing's FAA changed the regulations protecting your margin of safety when flying from 250% (as I remember) of maximum expected level of structural stress in service to 150%, deleting an entire 100% of margin of safety when you fly.
Now, after this 1970 or prior change, you only have a 50% margin of safety when flying, whereas the FAA before required a 150% margin of safety in the structure of the Boeing plane you flew on.
How many corrupt FAA managers and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas managers personally were paid off to get this huge decrease in mandated safety margins enacted? Many corrupt FAA and Boeing managers of that time can IMO likely trace the ability for themselves to pay for their much bigger houses, fancier cars, better looking prostitutes, better wines and scotches in their collections, and abilities to fund their kid(s) college educations to that one key change in FAA regulations.
And, as noted earlier, corrupt Boeing managers, engineers, undeservedly Authorized (FAA) Representatives, and Quality engineers are always hard at work doing exactly the opposite of what you would expect them to do, or what their actual job descriptions state they should be doing--they are decreasing your levels of safety when you unwisely choose to fly Boeing's safety sub-optimized, almost built, defect riddled airplanes.
Boeing's constant attack on the quality and safety of Boeing almost built airplanes is so widespread and so historically prevalent that almost all aspects of Boeing's RICO-esque business engage in it. Yes, greed in trying to bump up Boeing employee stock option values is the main driver, but there are many other ancillary reasons as well that flow into that. One huge reason Boeing always is trying to reduce your levels of safety while flying is sales. Boeing is engaged in a duopoly with a competitor, Airbus, that actually completes their airplanes before delivery and actually inspects them during the production process.
This sales competition must be won or fought to a draw in order for corrupt Boeing management to maximize their stock price related compensation. Therefore Boeing even makes changes throughout the design and production processes just to enable them (in their minds) to compete and win these airplane sales competitions. Do they boast about Boeing's greater quality and safety over Airbus to customers during these presentations to airlines? No. They can't win there with their defect riddled airplanes, especially since many airlines they present to have flown Boeing airplanes before or currently fly them, and they know about all of the Newly Delivered Airplane Reports they send to Boeing about defects they find in them as delivered from Boeing, as well as the small subset of defects as delivered that later show up in service.
So, as they can't compete in these presentations on quality and safety, as subverting those is a key competitive discriminator for Boeing (IMO), they compete on such things as airplane weight and fuel burn per passenger, as well as cargo capacity. These are things corrupt Boeing management strive very seriously to ensure are better stats than Airbus' data in their presentations. Airbus usually will lose many of those comparisons because Airbus won't cut safety margins to win in those areas. Corrupt Boeing, however, has no compunction doing so, and are willing to cut your safety margins to the maximum if it will help them get the sales that pump up their stock options' values.
To do this, Boeing has engineering go through virtually every part on the plane, cutting weight and the structural safety margins on each, to the knife's edge of what's very, very marginally safe, and what's unsafe.
This is why Airbus planes are heavier per passenger. As an example, Airbus will use the same shear tie or stringer clip for as many locations as possible in a design, while Boeing will have many different part numbers in each area because some engineer has concluded that the part in that area doesn't have to be as strong (heavy). The directive by Boeing Sales/Boeing upper management that weight per passenger is key to winning sales campaigns drives this safety margin sub-optimizing effort. And so, your safety on Boeing planes further reduces. Add to that fact that Boeing has a QA department rife with fraud and that the records saying inspections were done and passed aren't worth the paper or magnetic tape or other computer media they are stored on, and you have the situation that even the minimum razor thin levels of safety Boeing engineers design into Boeing planes are never assured in any Boeing airplane almost built.
So that's our lesson in Boeing corruption for today, the day after Halloween. If you don't want to leave this world before your time, fly Airbus, and never Boeing, as Boeing is always greedily trying to make your Boeing flight less safe as noted. Take it from this very experienced with Boeing/FAA management corruption former QA inspector at Boeing for almost 10 years. Corrupt Boeing management will never admit to this truth, but Boeing not only constantly cuts costs and flow times as they are constantly telling investors in the press. Boeing just as zealously cuts the quality and safety of each new airplane model, new derivative thereof, and new line number airplane.
A Boeing QA supervisor when I was an inspector in Boeing Flight Test QA told me the manager layers above him were constantly telling him to "go out and raise the stock price." How does a Boeing QA manager raise the stock price? By making sure their inspectors don't actually inspect and find defects, and just rollerstamp the paperwork stating that they did. Nothing more drastically cuts costs and reduces production flow times than QA fraud that ensures that the maximum amount of production defects deliver on the airplane to the customer. Inspecting for defects, documenting them, reworking them, and inspection of that rework/repair before delivery costs massively more money and flow time than Boeing's pretend (rollerstamping) inspections. The more defects and the more severe the defects that mechanics produce during production, the more money is saved by Boeing's rollerstamping QA fraud.
Look for edits and links added in the near future. We here at "The Last (Boeing) Inspector Website" don't have a research department always on staff.
Wow! Check this out, I just posted this originally a few minutes ago, and Boeing and the FAA have already further reduced your level of safety on the 777X! Ali Bahrami at work for Boeing again? Why can't we even have a 50% margin of safety until our deaths are extremely improbable on an almost built Boeing airplane? SMH.
In summary, the start of 777X production is something to mourn, not celebrate, for it is likely the new level of quality and safety subversion put in place as noted during design and production and non-inspection of this new Boeing airplane derivative will be the cause of scores if not hundreds of people's deaths some day. Their Death Certificates, however, will never list their actual root cause of death: Boeing/FAA management corruption.
The Last Inspector