Boeing's FAA Lets It Write Rollerstamping into Its Quality Mismanagement System, and Boeing eliminates "Quality Assurance Inspector" Jobs Company-wide, Replacing Them With "Product Acceptance Specialists"
It is a very sad thing for the flying public to report that Boeing's regulatory captured FAA has let Boeing further subvert their quality system even more than its already severely compromised state by letting Boeing essentially legalize the rollerstamping of the most safety critical production processes used in the production of Boeing's already defect riddled as delivered airplanes.
This apparently started in 2013 in Boeing's union avoidance 787 factory in South Carolina, no doubt approved by Boeing's FAA Transport Airplane Directorate Manager of the time and unindicted co-conspirator with corrupt Boeing management, Ali Bahrami.
It was Bahrami that ensured that my report to the FAA of rampant fraud in Boeing Quality Assurance management was killed without an actual investigation of over 90% of the 382 Boeing quality system noncompliances I reported to them, or an investigation of the main, central thing that I requested they focus their investigation on--the rampant Boeing QA management fraud that was the root cause of those 382 QA system noncompliances.
This change approved by Boeing's FAA puppet Bahrami allowed Boeing to go from 100% required inspection of many critical production processes to as little as 17% inspection (with an average of 19.5%) of those critical to commercial and military passenger and crew safety production processes.
This in effect writes Boeing management's QA rollerstamping fraud this site is largely about into Boeing's quality system.
I estimate that Boeing management directed and Boeing Legal approved rollerstamping fraud by inspectors at Boeing misses approximately 80% of the defects created by Boeing mechanics.
Those approximately 80% of defects Boeing mechanics create deliver as is to Boeing's commercial and military customers on their airplanes and other Boeing commercial and defense products, and Boeing then banks the hundreds of millions they illegally get each year by such fraud to their bottom line with the much faster production flow and lower rework costs the passing of those defects on to their customers produces.
Is inspecting only 19.5% of processes so safety critical that they formerly required 100% inspection by Boeing Engineering and the FAA concerning to you? It should be. But that isn't the worst of it.
Who is doing these 19.5% "audits" of these safety critical production processes?--The same Boeing rollerstamping inspectors that Boeing QA mismanagement has groomed to rollerstamp for decades now.
So, considering that, how many of the defects in the 19.5% of safety critical Boeing production processes still required to be inspected by Boeing's puppet ran FAA end up being caught after all of the rollerstamping is said and done? 20% of the defects that could be found in that 19.5% of those safety critical production processes? That would mean only about 5% of the defects in all 100% of the work "inspected" would be found by Boeing's rollerstamping inspectors before the airplanes delivered to Boeing's customers as is. 95% of the defects in the noted safety critical processes are likely missed as a result of Boeing QA inspectors' rollerstamping the inspections of the 19.5% of those production processes they are still allowed to inspect. That's a staggering amount of QA fraud, and extremely dangerous to anyone risking flying on any of Boeing's already defect riddled airplanes.
This means Boeing's already defect riddled airplanes as documented on this site are now defect riddled on steroids.
Boeing does supposedly use "process survey questionnaires" during the 19.5% of those safety critical production processes its inspectors audit, but I wouldn't bet on anything on those surveys being accurate or complete before they are rollerstamped off by Boeing QA inspectors because Boeing Quality Engineers (who should be writing those surveys) in my experience are just as corrupt as your average careless Boeing rollerstamping inspector and the worst of corrupt Boeing management.
This effective writing of rollerstamping into Boeing safety critical production process inspections made its way up to the Everett factory on the 787 program at the start of 2016, per my information.
The extent of the spread of the noted writing of Boeing QA rollerstamping fraud into safety critical production process inspections since the beginning of 2016 is unknown. It quite well could be standard procedure at all Boeing Commercial Airplane (BCA) sites as of now, anywhere in America and even at Boeing suppliers.
As you will see later, Boeing seems to have extended this formalization of rollerstamping fraud across all of Boeing--not just BCA production sites.
Details are somewhat sketchy because I am no longer witnessing Boeing's subversion of its and its suppliers' quality systems first hand as much as I used to, but the safety critical processes that Boeing is subverting through this fraud are close tolerance hole inspections, safety critical torque witnessing by inspectors, hole cold working inspections, safety critical electrical bonding inspections, and other production processes.
These production processes could cause a crash if they are not done correctly 100% of the time. Safety critical structure could fail as a result of the wrong size close tolerance holes, cold working not done as required, and/or improperly torqued structural and flight control system bolts. Critical drawing designated fastener torques improperly done could imperil dozens of safety critical airplane applications, from flight control systems to critical engine related fastener torques. Safety critical electrical bonding inspections not done correctly could affect any number of critical to flight electrical systems negatively as well as destroy or cause a crash of an airplane as a result of a lightning strike.
That is why these production processes were designated by Boeing engineering and the FAA for 100% inspection in the first place when the Type Design of each Boeing airplane model was approved. Now at least 80.5% of those safety critical inspections will never be done because corrupt Boeing management and their FAA believe that smoothing production flow for Boeing is more important than your safety and your loved ones' safety when flying on a Boeing airplane.
This overriding of the original FAA and Boeing Engineering type design requirements designating which production processes were so critical to safety of each Boeing airplane model that they required 100% inspection (in the name of the pure greed of Boeing and the FAA management that approved this change, no doubt for future quid pro quo Boeing do nothing jobs post FAA retirement) is reprehensible, and willfully negligent to public and military personnel flight safety.
Here's a section of my report to the FAA that the FAA refused to investigate the vast majority of from my 4/1/07 Daily Report Quote:
'An incident that shows how useless the current non-system of inspecting drawing designated electrical bonds at PSD is illustrated by the following:
I stamped in on a "job complete" inspection on the call sheet for (name), 747/767 EBU mechanic (I believe the job number and unit was N93114A on RM245 POS 4). There was an electrical bonding inspection that wasn’t yet bought off, so I got the M1 meter and went to the EBU to do my usual "witness" (by doing the resistance test myself) of the electrical bonding of the two jumpers on the two valves of the 14th stage duct installation that were the subject of the inspection operation.
(The noted mechanic) was right there, and as I hadn’t looked at the drawing yet, I asked him what the resistance requirement was on the two jumpers that he installed all of the time. He said, "I don’t know." I did the testing and looked up the requirement on the drawing. They were within requirements. I bought the inspection.
So much for the theory that, even though inspectors at PSD do not (except for the few inspectors like me) do the required testing of designated bonds (and instead roller stamp the buyoffs), that no one should worry, as the shop mechanics "self-inspect" them to make sure these critical bonds are per drawing requirements, anyway.'
This illustrates just how fucked up the system used to be when certain electrical bonds required 100% inspection by mechanics and inspectors on critical components of Boeing turbofan (jet) engine build-ups (EBUs). Most inspectors (except me) rollerstamped them off without inspection and mechanics never checked them either.
This change just writes that fraudulent system into Boeing's eminently corrupt quality system.
And I wouldn't call this formalized rollerstamping fraud the end of Boeing's subversion of its quality system in the name of greed over your safety in the least. If they haven't already, Boeing and their FAA might be working to extend this rollerstamping fraud formalization into much more than the most safety critical inspections as noted--they are likely pushing to implement these less than 19.5% done inspections into everything inspected at Boeing--every part, every assembly, and everything now requiring more than 19.5% inspection, so, at best, only 19.5% of the Boeing airplane you fly on will ever be inspected, no matter how critical to your safety that inspection is. And, as noted, 80% of the defects in that 19.5% of the airplane will never be caught by Boeing's rollerstamping inspectors, so Boeing airplanes will deliver with approximately 95% of the defects mechanics created during production as is, unaddressed in any way.
Those are defects of random location and random severity, so the safety of each individual Boeing airplane is just as random as the severity of those hidden defects.
Another aspect of this Boeing and FAA working together fraud to negate your safety that is corrupt Boeing management friendly is that the FAA is only requiring 17%-22% of the formerly 100% inspected critical to safety production processes to be inspected throughout each factory over a running total of any 90-day period. That means that Boeing mismanagement can skip inspecting 100% of those safety critical production processes on every airplane produced for approximately 72 days, and only inspect those processes for 18 or so days out of each 90 day period.
So, every airplane produced for over 10 weeks straight can be made without any of the noted safety critical production processes being inspected on them at all, as long as 18 or so days of production are inspected at the end or start of each 90 period, and Boeing would be compliant with this ludicrous and obviously dangerous system.
I am investigating this further, but Boeing's FAA coughs up information slowly, if at all. They don't want you to know that they are colluding with anti-quality and anti-safety corrupt Boeing management by this attempt to legalize Boeing's felonious rollerstamping fraud, or their other many abdications of their responsibilities to us, the public that funds them to protect our safety when flying.
So, as noted here many times, Boeing and the FAA are always hard at work subverting QA inspections that assure your safety in the never ending search for the least safety while flying that you will accept that maximizes Boeing profitability the most, as well as maximizes FAA management post retirement quid pro quo Boeing job payoffs the most.
But that's not all the news related to the above corruption negating much of your safety if you foolishly choose to risk flying Boeing's ever more defect riddled airplanes.
Boeing is so anti-quality and anti-inspection of any kind across the Boeing enterprise (as this fraud is directed from Boeing Headquarters), that, around the time of implementing this formalization of rollerstamping fraud in 2013 in their South Carolina plant, they started to rename all "Quality Assurance Inspectors" that do the noted rollerstamped audits in lieu of 100% inspections to "Product Acceptance Specialists."
It's hard to believe that any company at all would be so anti-quality, anti-safety, and anti-inspection to do this, especially in a safety critical to millions of lives industry like the commercial and military airplane and helicopter industry, but Boeing has actually done it, as you will see below.
There is nothing better to illustrate Boeing's contempt for all quality assurance and inspection of any kind than this. It proves yet again that corrupt Boeing management is behind the rollerstamping fraud detailed on this site that is only getting more and more extreme as time goes on.
They took "Quality Assurance" and "Inspector" out of Boeing Quality Assurance Inspectors' job titles at Boeing because those concepts are now verboten at Boeing.
What did they replace them with? Exactly what you would expect in a fraud based production system like Boeing's--inspectors no longer exist at most of Boeing. They are "specialists," instead. And what do they do? Assure quality and safety requirements are met? No. Their function is to accept everything they look at, and everything they don't. What is that called? Rollerstamping. Their new Boeing QA fraud friendly job title is now "Product Acceptance Specialists."
Boeing, in addition to subverting even safety critical inspections as noted above, is renaming QA inspectors at Boeing to a job title that is essentially "Rollerstamper," and has nothing to do with quality assurance other than contempt for even the name of the QA process.
And, sadly for fliers, astronauts, and our national security, Boeing has implemented this fraud based job title across the entire enterprise:
Boeing's 787 Program, South Carolina:
Boeing's Apache Helicopter Program, Mesa, Arizona:
Boeing's NASA Space Launch Systems (SLS) Program at the Michoud Assembly Facility, New Orleans, Louisiana:
Boeing's International Space Station Program, Kennedy Space Center, Florida:
Boeing's International Space Station Program, Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas:
Boeing's CST-100 Starliner Commercial Crew Transportation System Program, Titusville, Florida (Boy our astronauts are really fucked if Boeing gets the CCTS contract):
Boeing's Space and Missile Systems, Heath, Ohio:
Boeing's Networks & Space Systems DOD Classified Military Satellite Program, Smithfield, Rhode Island:
Boeing's Spectrolab Satellite Solar Cells Program, Sylmar, California:
Boeing's Aircraft Wire Harnesses and Electrical Sub-Assemblies, Smithfield, Pennsylvania:
Boeing's Cable and Wire Harness Assemblies, Salt Lake City, Utah:
Boeing's Circuit Card Assemblies, Cable Assemblies, and Electrical Boxes for RS-68 Engine, Space Launch System, PAC-3 Interceptor Missile, F-15 Fighter, and B1-B Bomber Programs, El Paso, Texas:
Boeing's Argon ST Electronic Warfare Systems, Fairfax, Virginia:
Boeing's AOG Aircraft Support, Garden Grove, California:
Boeing's T-6A and T-38C Air Force Flying Training Wing, Sheppard Air Force Base, Wichita Falls, Texas:
Boeing's DOD Spy Satellite Program (as Judged by Other Boeing Job Ads for This Boeing Location), Chantilly, Virginia
Boeing's 787 Program, Everett, Washington:
As you can see, anti-quality and anti-safety Boeing management has implemented this scam across the whole corrupt enterprise. Boeing management has long wished to effectively destroy real quality assurance across the company in order to massively reduce costs and radically shorten production flows.
They boast about the results of this fraud when they tout their moving production lines and "first pass quality" or "first time quality" to clueless investors. "first pass quality" and "first time quality" are just Boeing's public names for the rollerstamping fraud as documented across this site.
That is likely another reason they killed the QA Inspector job across Boeing, and replaced it with the "Product Acceptance Specialist" job title--"Product Acceptance Specialists" at Boeing largely accept whatever quality the 19.5% of the critical to safety processes they MIGHT actually look at and rollerstamp it as acceptable, no matter how defective the work is.
Corrupt Boeing management has long wanted to completely implement the Toyota Production System Lean Manufacturing method (which optimizes production flow without independent inspections of any kind) so that Boeing satellites, missiles, commercial and military airplanes, launch systems, helicopters, space capsules and everything else they almost build will roll off the production line just like Toyota cars do--as fast as possible without any significant inspection at all, regardless of the quality and safety of the work done on those cars.
That is the real reason for these changes--to make Boeing airplane production lines move faster and more efficiently, like the worst of automobile factory production lines, without the interference of inspectors slowing it down by actually doing their jobs of finding and documenting defects on the production line to be reworked before the airplane or other Boeing commercial or military product is delivered.
Proof? In 2013, Boeing hired Walt Odisho from Toyota's worst plant on the planet--its car manufacturing plant in Kentucky, where he was Vice President of Manufacturing. Yes, Kentucky, the armpit of America, where it's most famous offerings to the world are a yearly horse race with Latino jockeys, and Kentucky Bourbon Whiskey. It's not a state famous for its educated and skilled workers.
Toyota and Boeing's affinity for Southern plant locations probably has much more to do with people in those former slave states being more willing to do anything for the least amount of compensation--for "slave wages," or "right to work for less" wages and benefits than anything related to the available workers' skills or education or ability to do the jobs they are assigned.
But truthfully, it doesn't matter what kind of people build the airplanes or other quality and safety critical products a company produces as long as they have a bulletproof QA system to ensure the defects they produce don't get passed on to customers. That's why Boeing's subversion of its quality system across the enterprise as noted is so serious. Boeing has shown it doesn't care about the quality of people they hire, as long as they get the work done faster and cheaper, regardless of the quality of the work they do.
As noted, in 2013, Odisho was hired on to Boeing as Vice President of Manufacturing for Boeing Commercial Airplanes, from the same position at Toyota. This shows just how incompetent and clueless Boeing management is. No, car production isn't like airplane production. Airplane production is much more complex and regulated than automobile production. This is just another reason why, if it's Boeing, you and your family should not be going. If an automobile company wants to hire an airplane manufacturing executive, so be it. But the reverse should never be done. This shows the extreme carelessness of Boeing executive management when it comes to the quality and safety of the airplanes and other defense products Boeing almost builds.
So Boeing obviously cares much more about making its airplane production lines work like Toyota's terrestrial vehicle production lines than it cares about the quality or safety of the airplanes they almost build. This would be a joke if it wasn't actually being done by Boeing, and threatening real peoples' lives.
As you can read on my There is No Quality in Boeing Quality blog, the Quality organization has been a shell organization at Boeing Commercial Airplanes for many years, being ran by a Boeing executive with absolutely no quality experience. That alone shows Boeing executive management's dereliction of their responsibilities to assure the quality and safety of the airplanes they almost build. I won't repeat that blog here, but check it out if you haven't read it.
But that decrepit state of BCA's quality organization wasn't the worst it could be, so Boeing executive management hobbled it further. Less than a year ago, on July 14th, 2017, Boeing executive management shuffled the deck on its own Titanic further, hiring on another former Toyota executive into a critical position at BCA, hiring Ernesto Gonzalez-Beltran as BCA Vice President of Quality, even though he had no aerospace QA experience at all. Neither did Lindsay Anderson, the previous VP of Quality, but at least he wasn't only just a freaking CAR PART Manufacturing executive.
The noted organization change also made the BCA VP of Quality report directly to the BCA Manufacturing VP, as QA has illicitly done for decades at BCA. Odisho was promoted to the position of BCA VP of Manufacturing, Safety and Quality, and Ernesto Gonzalez-Beltran, VP of BCA Quality, reported directly to him, thereby making the QA organization report directly to the Manufacturing VP, and neither BCA Vice President had any experience in aerospace manufacturing, quality, or safety when Boeing hired them into senior aerospace VP positions.
Unqualified BCA VP of QA Lindsay Anderson was out, which was a good thing, but his replacement, Ernesto Gonzalez-Beltran, doesn't know anything about airplane production or QA--he was only a CAR PART MANUFACTURING executive. What could go wrong with such aviation incompetence in QA and with such pro manufacturing bias? Everything bad.
This raises so many red flags it isn't funny. Corrupt Boeing Executive Management has wanted to build airplanes like cars since 1995 or so.
They actually modeled their moving production line on the Toyota factory model, hence they put Odisho, the former Toyota executive, in charge of all BCA production. The first problem with this? defective airplanes can't just pull over to the side of the road when something goes wrong. This is obvious to everyone except corrupt Boeing management.
The next problem? The Toyota Production Model (TPM) has one axiom--no inspection, to maximize production flow which correspondingly always decreases quality. In announcing this change, BCA CEO Kevin McAllister said, "First-time quality improves safety and flow, reduces waste and enhances regulatory compliance.”
Not true. This neither enhances quality, safety, nor regulatory compliance. Demoting and further hobbling QA makes FAA regulation compliance impossible, not better. It also threatens safety. But notice the key thing here--he says that the changes will improve production flow.
This brings to mind the following quote from one of my reports to the FAA:
'...the (new) “Boeing Production System,”...is merely a ripoff of the Toyota Production System, one of whose mottos is “no inspection!” Where inspection is allowed, it is done by the mechanics using “Go/No Go” gauges.
I witnessed a conversation the weekend of July 12th, 2003 (last weekend as it is July 19th now) in the Flight Test QA Lead office.
Airworthiness Inspectors and their leads were discussing the ATA 757 that wanted to roll over and crash when landing. Flight Test was at that time trying to find out what was causing that problem and fix it so the customer would accept it for delivery.
A particularly boisterous inspector was speculating that the moving 757 line in Renton was to blame for the problem, and he was talking about how the father of one of the Flight Test QA Supervisors was head of Engineering for the B-29 (I believe that is what he said) program and that they had tried a moving line back then but had found it was impossible to do with aircraft for various reasons, one of which was correct alignment and rigging of parts of the aircraft, I believe. That’s when Boeing came up with the “beehive” method of building aircraft that BCAG had used up to the current “moving line” era.
He then launched into a litany of badmouthing the Vice President of Renton Airplane Programs that he said had come from MIT with the (to him) inane idea of building airplanes on a moving line. His reasoning was that they were doing moving lines despite past proven failure of it at Boeing because these current managers knew next to nothing about what it took to build airplanes and thought falsely that it was just like building cars.
It was then when Bill Young, an Approximately 37 year seniority Airworthiness Inspector Lead spoke up and said unbelievingly, “they think they are building fucking cars?” (Please excuse his “French.”)
The answer to Bill’s question is painfully obvious—yes they do believe airplanes can be built like cars—just like Toyota builds theirs--on a moving production line with no inspection whatsoever save maybe a few “Go/No Go” gauges used by mechanics if and when they have the time. Unfortunately, they do not care to realize that airplanes cannot pull over at 30,000 feet when they break down like cars can, and that is why they are supposed to be so carefully inspected during production.'
End of report quote.
What do they say about people not learning from history?
The noted org change just makes rollerstamping fraud formalized in the Boeing management organizational matrix. Per FAA requirements, the QA organization is supposed to have sufficient independence and authority to ensure that management of the organization they are supposed to independently ensure the quality of--manufacturing--cannot exert pressure on inspectors to not do their critical jobs with the thoroughness or integrity required.
Just when you think Boeing couldn't be more corrupt and anti-quality, they purposely devolve much further again, further endangering anyone and everyone who boards an always defect riddled Boeing airplane with the mistaken belief that the airplane has been fully inspected when delivered and is safe. Not so in the least, as you see here.
In conclusion, this shows yet again that every day Boeing airplanes aren't crashing, and even on days when they do, corrupt Boeing management is hard at work further subverting its quality and safety assurance processes across the enterprise, both legally and illegally (rollerstamping), in a quest for extra millions in profitability so more clueless investors will buy Boeing stock and increase their Boeing stock options' values.
Again, the above shows yet again that Boeing executive management has an extreme contempt for quality assurance and inspection of any kind across the enterprise. They consider QA inspection of their airplanes, space capsules, rockets, and all their other defect riddled products "non-value added," believing that Boeing products' safety margins are so wide that QA inspections are optional, even when required by the FAA.
They say a fish rots from the head, and the same is true at Boeing. Boeing executive management has gotten away with massive rollerstamping so long now that they don't even make an effort to make their QA department look competent or independent.
The only QA inspectors left at Boeing are in Washington State and the few other areas where workers' job titles are set in contract language.
But be forewarned union Boeing QA inspectors, Boeing will be renaming you as well to "Product Acceptance Specialists" in the next contract so that, like former inspectors in the other non-union locations noted, you will finally know your purpose is no longer to inspect the safety critical product and find defects so they can be fixed before delivery, it is only to accept the product without any inspection, regardless of the quality of the work, just like bubba built Kentucky Toyotas.
In closing, thanks very much to the Boeing employees that are rightly worried about these changes that reported this to me. It's nice to know some Boeing employees still care about the quality and safety of Boeing airplanes, unlike their corrupt management.
For everyone else, remember: If it's Boeing, you and your loved ones shouldn't be going.
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The Last Inspector