This quote is from a letter I wrote to Boeing's chief corporate counsel (a member of the Boeing Board of Directors, I believe) in October 2002 after the FAA performed an intentionally very limited and Boeing corruption friendly non-investigation of my report that I received the intentionally minimal results of in August 2002. My next steps to get reform at Boeing were limited at that point, and all but the most unlikely one--appealing to FAA headquarters again for a reinvestigation of my report after noting my well founded suspicions of corruption in the TAD that resulted in the intentionally very limited "investigation" of my report--required me to go public with Boeing and the FAA's corruption, a step I did not want to take as I did not want to take that step except as a last resort because I wanted to get reform in Boeing's quality system with the least damage to Boeing's reputation possible. I would have went public in heartbeat if it meant only that Boeing's corrupt QA management would suffer the consequences of such bad publicity and be replaced, but I knew that mostly innocent hourly employees like I was would also suffer consequences if I had to resort to getting the public to protect themselves from the corruption in Boeing Quality Assurance management, and it was the non-management employees that were already suffering layoffs at that point. I resolved to take a different route--to contact Boeing Headquarters management in blind faith that they were not involved in the corruption in their lower management ranks at BCA. I attempted to use a potential lawsuit and going public--the two other major routes I could take at that time--as leverage in case Boeing Headquarters management did not want to act to stop the corruption just because it was the ethical and lawful thing to do, and needed additional motivation to act in the public and military personnel safety interests.
In response to my letter, Boeing's chief counsel assigned the same attorney that had investigated the Boeing theft of competition sensitive data from its chief competitor on the EELV program competition. I had to help this attorney convert the reports I had forwarded to Boeing's chief counsel that I had submitted to the Boeing corruption biased FAA to a format the attorney's computer software would open. After several weeks, Boeing Headquarters decided to hide behind the FAA's non-investigation of virtually all the items in my report--chief among them the Boeing QA management corruption that engendered almost all of the other noncompliances documented in my report. It was at that point that I knew the corruption did not stop in the QA management ranks--it extended all the way into the Boardroom of Boeing Corporate Headquarters itself. And so it is to this day. CEOs and other positions on the Boeing Board change faces, but key personel on the Board refuse to act to stop this law breaking and defrauding of Boeing's commercial and military customers via the Product Subtitution that Boeing performs when it condones rollerstamping by not acting to stop it and/or by pretending it does not exist for Boeing's bottom line's sake. As noted in the home page, Boeing's chief counsel was so convinced of the truth of my allegations and the consequences for the company if this matter became public and gained media traction that he "hopped" a corporate jet to fly from Boeing Headquarters in Chicago to fly to BCA headquarters in Washington to personally handle this matter himself. If he knew that my allegations were not true, he simply would have ignored them, instead. It is this collusion between "working together" corrupt Boeing and FAA management that prevented Boeing from acting in a lawful and caring manner for the safety of the public in response to my letter quoted below that I am trying to end by getting the OIG to restore real and effective oversight of Boeing by reform of the FAA TAD that currently suckles from and mimics Boeing's corruption. Once that is done, the corrupt management at Boeing will have no agency to hide their corruption behind as they currently do in the TAD:
October 13, 2002
Senior Vice President and General Counsel
The Boeing Company
Boeing World Headquarters
100 N. Riverside
Chicago, IL 60606-1596
312-544-2800Re: FAA File Number 2002NM420013, Certificate Management Office Special Evaluation—Boeing Propulsion Systems Division, Everett Division, and Renton Division.
Dear Mr. (Name),
My name is Gerald Eastman, a Precision Assembly Inspector at BCAG, and although you likely have no idea who I am, there may be a slim chance that (Name), BCAG Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, or someone else in her office may know of me and/or the matter of which I write. That would likely only be the case if Quality Assurance Management at the Propulsion Systems Division (PSD) of BCAG had contacted Boeing Legal regarding their possible suspicions of who had reported their corrupt activities to the local FAA MIDO office, and had named me, accurately, fingering who was to "blame" for that report. However, it is quite possible neither you or anyone in Boeing Legal know who I am or of my report because PSD had chosen not to advertise their likely suspicions for some reason known only to them, or perhaps even because, however unlikely, they never figured out who had submitted the report. In that doubtful latter possibility, they may have been befuddled because, even though in my report I requested the FAA not to protect my identity if it would impede their investigation in any way, it appears that they may have intentionally ignored that request in order, not to protect me, but to use such "protection" of my identity as a convenient excuse in order to not investigate the corruption detailed in my report.
And that is one reason why I am writing to you now. I had submitted the report to the MIDO office in two parts, on January 28th and May 31st of this year, detailing the rampant corruption that is ongoing within the Quality Assurance Management ranks at BCAG that is decimating even the minimally required levels of effectiveness of our FAA required Quality System purposely. QA Managers, in a misguided attempt to create "value" for the Company, please their managers (and Manufacturing) to retain their jobs, and/or attempting to pad their pocketbooks with hefty future merit bonuses, are not ensuring their inspectors do their essential safety related jobs to assure the quality of the airplanes we build, but instead are doing exactly the opposite—ensuring they do not, and/or cannot do their inspection jobs lest the costs of documentation and rework of valid defects detract from the current quarter’s bottom line. How do they do this? Mostly by doing nothing, letting the "Quality Assurance Organization airplane" remain pilotless and withholding any kind of maintenance due to their intentional absence and neglect, allowing that essential "vehicle" to the safety and quality of our aerospace products to "fall out of the sky," thereby disabling it so it will not get in Manufacturing’s way of delivering products "under cost" and "on schedule," or as (name), former fellow inspector liked to put it—allowing Manufacturing to "push more garbage out the door," without the "luxury" of inspectors performing their jobs. By doing this, they achieve their long held ultimate goal—manufacturing self-acceptance in A&I areas of our factories—years earlier, and without the required FAA approval that they fear may never come (due to the FAA’s certain knowledge of just how intentionally ineffective our Quality System is) in time to meet their "value creation" goals.
The vast majority of inspectors know there is effectively no one "at the wheel" of our Quality System, and know they can do their jobs (or, more accurately, not do their jobs) any way they want to without fear of reprisal. Soon they learn they do not have to do their jobs at all, and many succumb to becoming what their management wants them to be—anything but inspectors doing the job of inspecting. Many like the freedom of surfing the internet and/or "shooting the breeze" all day with fellow workers their coveted "welfare inspection jobs" allow them to do. The only real "work" they have to do is to get up occasionally to stamp the inspections on the paperwork off. The only things they know will bring the wrath of their corrupt management down upon them is if the paperwork does not look like they actually did the inspections (stamps missing, etc.), or if they attempt to divert from their status of "inspectors on welfare" and begin to actually inspect the airplanes we build. However, not all inspectors—especially the ones like me—want to go that route intentionally made so easy for us. We know the importance of our jobs to countless people’s lives, and the future of this Company’s predominance in the commercial aircraft industry. We do not follow the path intended for us by our corrupt management, and instead work to "pull up" the essential "Quality Assurance Organization airplane" to save it, peoples lives protected by it, and BCAG, from destruction by actually doing our jobs of inspection per plan, procedures and engineering requirements. This is where QA Management’s plans to facilitate Manufacturing’s unimpeded pursuit of their cost and schedule targets by not doing our jobs goes awry, and where they must actively pursue their corrupt goals, by "getting their hands dirty." This involves active misinformation to line inspectors to make them believe their jobs are to do anything but actually inspecting mechanic’s work, transferring them into office "make work" jobs to make sure they cannot document defects on the airplane in order to cut costs by letting those defects deliver to customers, and transferring them completely out of the factory setting if they persist in attempting to do their jobs of inspection. I know. All of that, and more, has happened to me only because I persisted in my attempts to do my job despite such corrupt QA Management trying to convince me otherwise. Am I alone in being treated this way for only attempting to do my job? No--not by far. Many other inspectors who similarly attempted to do their jobs for ethical reasons have been also thusly treated.
Many ethical inspectors trying to do their jobs continue to labor in our corrupted Quality System, slightly or fully ignorant to the above facts. They don’t know fully why their jobs become exponentially more difficult and abusive the more they try to do their jobs, and why they receive only negative attention from shop and their management for trying to do their real jobs well. I was "in the dark" for a long time similarly, not fully understanding why doing my job well only seemed to cause me grief. However, looking back, I had known why everything was as it was, but had not wanted to consciously face that "unthinkable" truth. Thankfully, (name), my former QA Supervisor, put me in a room and "faced me with the facts." That 1/11 meeting, for me, had as profound an effect on me as 9/11 has had upon our nation. I have been "fully enlightened" to the true nature of our Quality System since then, and that pivotal meeting finally "got me off the fence" into my present somewhat quixotic (thus far) endeavor to single-handedly attempt to reform the corrupt BCAG Quality System.
The Last Inspector