See the letters I sent 7-31-06 and today to all Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) members by clicking on this link.
Below in the brief synopsis of my observations of Boeing/FAA corruption over the years, and descriptions of past and ultimately futile actions (before I contacted the OIG) I took to try to end that corruption, I noted "corruption within Boeing affecting U.S. National Security." The letters I wrote to the SASC describe that corruption in detail, and how Boeing (similarly to placing the attainment of efficiency and profitability goals over required safety assurance processes as noted on this site) continues to place the importance of meeting its own internal cost and schedule goals over the importance of compliance with export control laws meant to protect national security by keeping sensitive military technology out of the hands of our current and potential enemies.
This is happening after the infamous QRS-11 debacle where Boeing ignored the direction of our own State Department to meet delivery schedules and delivered airplanes without the required export licenses. During settlement of that blatant violation of export laws, Boeing agreed to follow export law requirements, just as they did after two (three if you count the pre-merger Hughes violations) previous violations of export laws. However, my letters detail export violations Boeing still has not been held accountable for extending back many years to today dealing with the transfer of B-2 composite design data illegally from the military to the commercial side of Boeing without the permission of the owners of that R&D data--the DOD and the B-2 prime contractor.
In addition to transferring this data within Boeing without the required licenses and permissions, the data was also disclosed outside Boeing when parts using that data were outsourced.
Boeing has used some highly questionable if not outright illegal methods to intentionally dodge export laws, such as giving composite process specifications to the University of Washington to make those specifications "public data," in order to take advantage of the "public data" exemption to the ITAR law.
But the above is just a few of the details of this new export law violation debacle by Boeing, perhaps the most serious yet. Picture our enemies with stealth aircraft and you get an idea of the possible consequences.
Boeing has the lawyers and personnel to try and make this whole affair go away quietly without the requisite thorough investigations and resulting fines and criminal charges, if warranted by those investigations. By my exposing these violations publicly in the press in the past and currently requesting the SASC to get to the bottom of the whole affair to ensure the proper and thorough investigations are and/or were done (in the unlikely, in my opinion, case a thorough and independent investigation was done by the relevant agency/agencies, which would not of course include the Commerce Department, which Boeing would likely prefer to have do such an investigation, if any had to be done), I am trying to ensure that these "new" export violations are not "swept under the rug," and that any damage to our national security from these violations is found and rectified.
So, as you can read above and in my letters, I have not limited myself to righting the Boeing/FAA corruption this site is mostly about. I have also sought to ensure Boeing is brought to justice for other misdeeds that could be far worse for our nation as a whole if countries our export laws prohibit from having this data make use of the noted data for their own military's use.
These violations came to my attention when I was collecting data to submit to the appropriate authorities to end the Boeing/FAA fraud detailed on this site.
It is imperative that the SASC (assuredly the 110th Congress SASC now that the 109th Congress is at its end) perform a review of the extent of the unauthorized military composite data transfer and the ultimate damage it may have to our present and future national security interests. No outsourcing strategy to obtain cheaper labor and therefore less expensive composite structural components should outweigh our national security interests.
Today's Daily Report Quote
An additional quote from the "letter never sent" (except to the OIG):
They do not ensure Quality and Safety as they are supposed to per our FAA-approved Quality System’s writings.
The Last Inspector