An additional quote from the "letter never sent" (except to the OIG). This is an especially long quote due to the fact it could be taken out of context (more than other parts of the letter) if given in small tidbits.
As stated at the beginning of this section, what I’ve learned during this "non-fix" of the...discrepancy "drama" goes a long way to solving which one of my former "theories" attempting to explain why many, if not all, BCAG Engineers seem to have purely purchased their degrees are in fact correct. Reiterated from page 159 of my report:
Anyway, most engineers I worked with seemed to be that way (incompetent), with the lone exceptions of the engineers I worked with when I installed the first flap supports on the 777 and the PEDs. Most Liaison Engineers seemed to be lost if they didn’t have a similar previous tag to copy the disposition from, or would simply ask you what disposition you wanted and wrote it on the tag.
I joked once, to who I don’t remember, that most engineers I knew couldn’t engineer their way out of a wet paper bag given a pencil, a piece of paper, a calculator, and a Stanley knife. When I was a mechanic or inspector on the 777, I would choose my passwords based on species of dinosaurs, silently voicing my belief that the 777, the plane that everyone was so excited about, as it was a "totally new airplane," was only a 767 that the engineers had put the design of in a Catia terminal, and pushed the "enlarge" key.
Sure, a lot of new technology was introduced in areas on the 777, but the design was pretty much the same. Airbus copied this same ancient Boeing design in their A/Ps. It was nothing new and exciting like the B-2 was when I worked on it, or the Sonic Cruiser will be. Anyway, most of the engineers I met at BCAG seemed, as I painfully made evident in my joke, unable to engineer their way out of a wet paper bag, much less able to engineer some of the most complex machines on the planet.
This led me to think up wild laughable theories of how this could happen, back when I was a mechanic, of how Boeing airplanes managed to even get off the ground at all with such engineers doing the engineering, much less get into service with the airlines carrying huge loads of people and cargo without immediately disintegrating.
One theory of mine to explain the situation was that Boeing had some real brainiac-type engineers that did the "mental heavy lifting" of safety related engineering on all new A/P programs, leaving the "minor engineering," such as bracketry engineering and liaison engineering on MRB dispositions (after all, all MRB-type situations had come up previously on one Boeing A/P tag or another over the years, and so Liaison Engineering’s job was just to find that previous disposition, and cut-and-paste it onto the new tag) to the engineers I knew that would die of starvation if trapped in a wet paper bag (sorry for the repetition).
The other wild theory to explain the situation was the same, except it assumed that no such brainiac engineers existed, and they all would be challenged by wet paper bags. That theory theorized that "space aliens" (as opposed to the illegal alien type) served the function of the non-existent brainiac engineers, doing all of our critical A/P design, and leaving the rest for BCAG engineers.
After reading the above excerpt, I’m sure you can pick out which "theory" the above happenings support. (Name) is no bracketry Engineer or "lowly" Liaison Engineer—he is a propulsion structures DER and stress Engineer. His actions in this matter bode ill for the safety of all those who choose to board the (787) starting in 2008—that is, if the "space aliens" who did the "mental heavy lifting" in designing our former airplanes have not returned to earth to do so for the (787). Yep, it is the most ludicrous and laughable "out of this world" theory I made up to explain the incompetence of Engineers I worked with and saw the dispositions of on tags that is supported by my dealings with (name), DER.
(Name) I don’t include in this part of the letter due to the fact I think he may actually be a good Engineer—if removed from the corrupting influences of "Lean Engineer" (name). Every time I saw them together, (name) seemed to defer to (name) much the way a juvenile dog will always defer to the "head of the pack" until strong enough to take him down and take his place. I believe that if (name) was freed from (name's) tutelage, he may be able to make ethical Engineering decisions, so I’ll give him the benefit of the doubt.
But my view of (name's) place in the incompetent/corrupt BCAG Engineer strata is beyond reproach, I believe. He seemed exclusively concerned with any "criticism" of the design change he approved he saw in my NCR’s existence, rather than concerned about the questions any ethical Engineer should be concerned about: Was an error made? And, if so, where was the error made, what needs to be done to fix the design, is the current design unsafe, and what needs to be done to ensure the mistake is never made again?
But, as he approved the change, he skipped over all of those questions he should have asked, and immediately began to make ludicrous assertions to try to get my NCR on his design negated. Whether he believed or did not believe the ludicrous assertions he made that (the engineering specification) did not apply to the installation, that any new hire "baby" new to Boeing production processes would almost immediately have known after minimal training, is immaterial—either way his "goose is cooked" as far as being an incompetent/unethical Engineer goes. Obviously, the same corrupting influences that have turned BCAG’s Quality System into the dregs described in my report are at play in (name's) corruption: A sole influence on Cost and Schedule as opposed to what his true function in the BCAG production system should be—to ensure the Quality and Safety of our Engineering designs.
You saw that corruption in his (described) statements, his actions, in his comments about "supportive of efficient production," and his title of "Lean Engineer." How he got picked and approved as a DER I will never understand, I fear. Such Engineers that thusly place Cost and Schedule concerns over Quality and Safety concerns should never be considered, much less approved, for DER positions. Engineers who additionally have no idea how BAC specs function with our engineering drawings especially should be prohibited from being DERs, lest they make inane (if not intentional) "mistakes" like the one (name) ensured was made in the case of my...NCR.
Of course, I don’t believe that any "space aliens" have even visited our planet, much less are Engineering the (787). But, from what we’ve seen in this case, perhaps we should hope, however unlikely it is, that that is the case, rather than face up to the reality that Engineers of (name's) caliber and ethics are designing it and doing final signoffs on the designs.
The Last Inspector