This quote is also from my first report to the FAA local MIDO office, when I was naive and chose not to believe all those press reports about the FAA being the "handmaiden of the aviation industry" and a "tombstone agency." This quote is from the section of my report noted in the first quote below that I deleted to make that quote shorter and I stated that I may quote later. This quote from that section details my history as an inspector at Boeing, and some of the other corrupt Boeing QA supervisors I've worked for over the years:
When it came time to inspect the wire bundle job, I ignored (my QA supervisor's) unethical, I thought, direction, and inspected the bundle like I always did. I found 29 defects on the wire bundle job, including two loose connectors, one on the IDG, that may have passed functional testing, but may have loosened more in service, causing an in-flight fault. I found a wire pinched by a wire bundle clamp enough that it probably would have shorted out in service. I found multiple un-sleeved breakouts crossing over the wires of the main bundle that probably would have rubbed across each other under vibration in service and cross-circuited.
I knew I didn’t have to, as the engine would still work without the wire bundle, but I bravely risked shop’s potent wrath by having them fix all of them. (The Manufacturing supervisor) often stood by the engine and watched his crew and me as usual. I knew that one wrong write-up, or taking a few minutes more on an inspection than he thought I should, would result in another meeting with (my QA supervisor). Not looking at the drawing on the wire bundle job saved at least 15 minutes. I felt bad when, after I was done inspecting the bundle, a shop mechanic, (name), found one of the wire bundle clamps on the L/H lower core was missing. Oh well, I never would have seen that one without looking at the drawing, which (my QA supervisor) had said was unnecessary, and the engine could run without the entire wire bundle, clamps and all.
The Last Inspector