The Last Boeing Inspector
  • The Last Inspector's Blog
  • The Boeing-FAA "Working Together" Fraud Negating Boeing Airplane Quality
  • Boeing's 100 Year Heritage of Building Something Worse Than Required
  • Boeing's Vast Network of Fraud
  • Other Boeing Fraud
  • Troubling Facts about Boeing's Culture of Fraud
  • Jump Page
  • About/Contact Me
  • Crashes Because of Rollerstamping
  • What is Rollerstamping?
  • New Fraud, Same as the Old Fraud
  • Boeing Workers Agree: Only Fly on Boeing Planes if you Have a Death Wish

​
​​​

Daily Report Quote

3/6/2007

 

This quote is also from my first report to the FAA local MIDO office, when I was naive and chose not to believe all those press reports about the FAA being the "handmaiden of the aviation industry" and a "tombstone agency." This quote is from the section of my report noted in the first quote below that I deleted to make that quote shorter and I stated that I may quote later. This quote from that section details my history as an inspector at Boeing, and some of the other corrupt Boeing QA supervisors I've worked for over the years:
Earlier in that overtime, I had found that the mechanics had installed the wrong configuration cowl actuators on one of the struts in their rush to complete the work (NCR...). I probably wouldn’t have noticed that without looking at the drawing. (The shop supervisor) and his lead grew even more angry with me. I found a radius filler that shop had installed upside down, with the sharp edge of the radius filler nesting in the mating radius of the bracket that the radius of the filler should have been in. The shop wanted an NCR written on it, rather than changing it out to correct the problem. I couldn’t believe that an engineer would allow a use-as-is disposition on such a defect. Maybe it would not cause a problem in service, but it sure stuck out like a sore thumb. I suggested to the shop lead or mechanic (I don’t remember which) that it might be better to just put a new filler in rather than waste all of the time on the NCR in which the engineer would probably say to replace it anyway. (The shop supervisor) came over and blew up at me: "You WILL right up what I tell you to write up. That’s your only job. If I want you to write it, you WILL write it." I had no intention of not writing it up, I was just getting my two cents in on the matter, but tempers were flaring due to me stepping briefly out of the PSD inspector’s customary subservient and obedient role, obviously. I always seemed to have good relationships with the Manufacturing Supervisors and Leads when I was new to an area at PSD, until they realized I would not bend to their wishes when it came to doing my job. Anyway, I shut up and wrote revision 1 of NCR... on the filler. To make a long story short, I finally got through the shake on that strut despite the many challenges and cold stares of the Manufacturing Lead and Supervisor, and left the other strut for second shift to finish and went home. That was perhaps the worst day of inspection I had ever had at PSD. As you can see, I didn’t much care how shop felt about me, if their bad feelings for me sprang only from me attempting to do my job. Although, in retrospect I should have cared, if I wanted to keep my job.


Comments are closed.

    Author:

    The Last Inspector
    Gerald Eastman

    Archives

    November 2018
    June 2018
    May 2018
    April 2018
    March 2018
    January 2018
    December 2017
    November 2017
    July 2017
    June 2017
    April 2017
    March 2017
    February 2017
    January 2017
    December 2016
    October 2016
    August 2016
    July 2016
    June 2016
    May 2016
    March 2011
    February 2011
    December 2010
    September 2010
    August 2010
    July 2010
    June 2010
    February 2010
    January 2010
    September 2009
    July 2009
    June 2009
    May 2009
    April 2009
    February 2009
    January 2009
    December 2008
    September 2008
    August 2008
    July 2008
    June 2008
    May 2008
    April 2008
    March 2008
    February 2008
    January 2008
    October 2007
    September 2007
    August 2007
    July 2007
    June 2007
    May 2007
    April 2007
    March 2007
    February 2007
    January 2007
    December 2006
    November 2006
    October 2006
    September 2006
    August 2006
    June 2006

    Categories

    All
    Airbus-is-actually-regulated
    Airbus Must Be A Monopoly
    Boeing Centennial
    Boeing-chief-counsel-letter
    Boeing-continues-to-offend
    Boeingfaa-fraud
    Boeing Improper Delegation
    Boeing Production Cuts
    Boeing Quality A Shell Organization
    Boeing Quality Subversion
    Boeing Quid Pro Quo Hiring Of Government Officials
    Boeing's Legacy Of Corruption
    Boeing-spreading-corruption
    Daily Report Quote
    Doug Bain Letter
    First Blog Post
    First Letter To FAA
    Important Announcements
    Important Warning
    Inspector General Investigation
    Necessity Of Boeing Failure
    OIG Letter
    Sabatini Letter
    Safer Crew And Passengers
    The Evil Nature Of Boeing Management
    Thomas Nakamichi Meeting
    Unlike Boeing

    RSS Feed

Proudly powered by Weebly
  • The Last Inspector's Blog
  • The Boeing-FAA "Working Together" Fraud Negating Boeing Airplane Quality
  • Boeing's 100 Year Heritage of Building Something Worse Than Required
  • Boeing's Vast Network of Fraud
  • Other Boeing Fraud
  • Troubling Facts about Boeing's Culture of Fraud
  • Jump Page
  • About/Contact Me
  • Crashes Because of Rollerstamping
  • What is Rollerstamping?
  • New Fraud, Same as the Old Fraud
  • Boeing Workers Agree: Only Fly on Boeing Planes if you Have a Death Wish