This is another quote from the letter noted in the 8-20-06 quote:
Has my forced transfer to my FTQA "non-production job" changed my horrific experiences that have proven my objective view of the corrupt BCAG Quality System? Far from it. (name), a FTQA Lead with over 30 years at Boeing, who sits at the desk just behind me in the FTQA Lead office, has told me, and others, more than one time that he is surprised no Boeing Flight Test planes have crashed recently because they have taken off in unairworthy conditions because FTQA Management has "tied the hands" of FTQA inspectors so they cannot do their jobs. An FTQA Airworthiness Inspector said once that the Company "would really be f***ed" if certain parts of the FTQA inspection responsibilities were audited by the FAA (he obviously gives the FAA too much credit for being objective, as I know now I once did, but I now know otherwise). I could go on and on, but I won’t.
The above is "in a nutshell" what is contained within my report the FAA MIDO, except my 400 some-odd page report goes into far greater detail and gives concrete examples of said corruption, along with dealing with many more facets of our corrupt Quality System I cannot include in this letter due to its necessary "brevity." Anyway, as I said, I submitted the last part of the report on May 31st of this year. While submitting that portion of the report (the lion’s share of it—only 49 pages had been submitted January 28th), I learned that the first part of my report had been "investigated" by one ASI and this "investigation" had resulted in no findings. I was still at PSD at the time of the investigation, and had never even noticed it occurring, it was apparently conducted so subtly. The MIDO personnel stated they had not notified me of the investigation results "because I had not requested a written report." They also said they had only investigated a few of the items I submitted because investigating the other items might have exposed my identity. (I did ask them not to reveal my identity as the submitter to deter any further retaliation from my management than I had received up to that point for doing my job, but I had no idea they would use it as a excuse to impede the investigation, or else I would not have agreed to have them protect my identity.) I should have realized the obvious then, but I submitted the rest of my report and asked them to investigate its contents, along with the items in the first part of my report, without regard to keeping my identity secret if that would impede the investigation in any way.
Unfortunately, my report was put "on the back burner," and despite repeated inquiries by me to the MIDO to ensure its fate was not the same as the previous report’s, it seemed as if the investigation would be quashed because of the excuse of the lack of MIDO resources or "more important MIDO duties." The Senior ASI I was contacting suggested I "write to Congress" to get the resources I wanted assigned to the investigation. I had not thought of that idea before, but I thought I had little choice at that time, so I did. I wrote to (name), FAA Administrator at the time, requesting the necessary resources for the investigation and asked her to work with Washington Senators Patty Murray and Maria Cantwell to ensure those resources were obtained. I sent that letter to both Senators, prefaced with a letter with additional information. When I received a reply from (name’s) assistant stating she had assigned the manager of the local TAD to perform the investigation, I contacted the Senior ASI again. What a change! The investigation would be begun forthwith. However, I should have been suspicious when he said they would investigate my "specific allegations" in my report (I had not made any "non-specific allegations" in my report. In fact, my report was chock full of specifics!). He also said that they did not investigate what he termed "personnel problems." I felt that was not directed at me or my report, as I had detailed what any casual observer could consider crimes and corruption, not mere "personnel problems." Still, I was suspicious enough to ask if they could involve the FBI and Justice Department if need be. He was evasive, but eventually said that they had done so at least once in the past.
Anyway, fast forward to late August. I received a letter from (name), detailing "preliminary results" of the investigation of some eight items, informing me that Boeing now would respond to those items once notified of them. Nothing terribly earthshaking was listed in the confirmed items from my report, which were only about ten percent of the items I had submitted that were only the symptoms of the real item I wanted investigated—the rampant corruption among QA Management ranks—the "disease" in the BCAG Quality System that intentionally allowed those "symptoms" to occur, which is what I had thought they were investigating per my "direction." I figured the most serious corruption related items were still under investigation, and were not listed in the letter due to what I had noticed as an obsession with any FAA personnel I talked to not to allow anything to be recorded on paper or electronic means that they would not want in the newspaper—especially, it seemed to me, anything critical of Boeing, and the fact that the letter was prefaced as "preliminary results." I knew that if the items listed on the letter were really the final results of the investigation, that all of my extensive efforts to get the System fixed would be in vain, for if the FAA only focused their investigation on the symptoms of the corruption in the QA Management ranks, and even if they wrote up the myriad things that were not being done per plan, procedure, and engineering by the QA Department and those items were rectified--every one of those "symptoms" would be back shortly at the behest of the corrupt QA Management that would be left in place at BCAG, untouched and unreformed from what I thought were their "criminal ways."
The Last Inspector