This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report from the section entitled, "More background to illustrate how I got my "thorough inspector" bad reputation (bad at BCAG), by only doing my job, while other inspectors didn’t do their jobs to "facilitate delivery of the product on time, by altering their inspection processes." The next several day's paragraphs can be read sequentially, as I wrote them. It should give pause to anyone thinking about the integrity of composite repairs done by Boeing, and bodes ill for the 787 program, where composite repairs will obviously be more frequent than on past aircraft, as much more composite surface area will be exposed to damage. This is one area of my report the corrupt personnel in the FAA's TAD chose not to investigate, probably due to the seriousness and obvious extent of the problem. Now it is up to the DOT OIG to get the required reforms in the inspections of these critical structural composite repairs before they possibly jeopardize the 787 program and current programs with structural composite parts. An additional note on this problem--although some of the inspection points for composite repairs were obvious and rollerstamped anyway, others were less so and required judgment to determine--judgment that rollerstamping inspectors obviously do not have. The procedures on some of these inspections were next to nonexistent, and where existent, sometimes vague. This was not apparent to rollerstamping inspectors, however I noticed it when trying to determine the way composite repairs should be inspected, as I was the first to do so in my time at PSD, and therefore somewhat of a pioneer. Even sadder from a compliance perspective was the fact that most of the guidance on what needed to be inspected came as word of mouth from the instructor in composite repair inspection class, the documentation was so bad. Of course the documentation being bad did not absolve the inspectors for rollerstamping the inspections off on the paperwork that they did not do. This of course was an impossible situation for me to try and reform internally without unbiased FAA help--help I sought, but sadly did not exist:
On composite repairs, I, the "thorough inspector", was the only inspector that would actually inspect the composite repairs on the T/R (Thrust Reverser) sleeves when the Field mechanics would leave the slats down when they opened the T/Rs, or maybe run the slats down into the open T/Rs, or would run something else into them, per inspection procedures, before stamping the work off. Because I inspected the work, and prior PSD inspectors had not, the composite repair technicians were very sloppy in their repairs at PSD, as they had always been under "self-inspection" at PSD, in effect, even though we made it look like the work was inspected by stamping the...composite repair record.., and NCR that did the work, off. Of course, it may have been that they did their jobs sloppily everywhere they worked. I had only anecdotal information on that, as I inspected only at PSD.
The Last Inspector