This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report from the section entitled, "More background to illustrate how I got my "thorough inspector" bad reputation (bad at BCAG), by only doing my job, while other inspectors didn’t do their jobs to "facilitate delivery of the product on time, by altering their inspection processes." The next several day's paragraphs can be read sequentially, as I wrote them. It should give pause to anyone thinking about the integrity of composite repairs done by Boeing, and bodes ill for the 787 program, where composite repairs will obviously be more frequent than on past aircraft, as much more composite surface area will be exposed to damage. This is one area of my report the corrupt personnel in the FAA's TAD chose not to investigate, probably due to the seriousness and obvious extent of the problem. Now it is up to the DOT OIG to get the required reforms in the inspections of these critical structural composite repairs before they possibly jeopardize the 787 program and current programs with structural composite parts. An additional note on this problem--although some of the inspection points for composite repairs were obvious and rollerstamped anyway, others were less so and required judgment to determine--judgment that rollerstamping inspectors obviously do not have. The procedures on some of these inspections were next to nonexistent, and where existent, sometimes vague. This was not apparent to rollerstamping inspectors, however I noticed it when trying to determine the way composite repairs should be inspected, as I was the first to do so in my time at PSD, and therefore somewhat of a pioneer. Even sadder from a compliance perspective was the fact that most of the guidance on what needed to be inspected came as word of mouth from the instructor in composite repair inspection class, the documentation was so bad. Of course the documentation being bad did not absolve the inspectors for rollerstamping the inspections off on the paperwork that they did not do. This of course was an impossible situation for me to try and reform internally without unbiased FAA help--help I sought, but sadly did not exist:
(My lead) came out to speak to me about the situation, stating that he had known that composite repair technician for, I believe, a seemingly ridiculous amount of time, like 15 years, and that he "did good work", implying I should not be looking at his work at all, like him. I said that, "We don’t buy off a mechanic’s work just by who he is, we buy off the work by inspecting the work itself, right?." (My lead), seemingly reluctantly, agreed. (my lead) was always good at spouting occasionally that things should be done per procedure, demonstrating, occasionally, quite a knowledge of those procedures, but when it came to actually performing his own inspections per those procedures, he ignored them, revving up his "Briggs and Stratton" endowed stamp to the redline in order to "support the delivery schedule." (another QA Lead) didn’t even have that many ethics, as he would tell you to ignore procedures, and then roller stamp. I had somewhat more respect, although it was in the negative range, for (the other QA Lead), because at least, in a sick way, he was more consistent in not doing his job. Anyway, I believe examples of the tags I wrote on these bad composite repairs were (NCR number) and (NCR number) Revision 1 and Revision 2, both on 737NG T/Rs.
The Last Inspector