This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report:
I spoke to the Panel Maintenance person to ask her why there were no MHIRs paneled with the 747/767 EBU jobs that install the wire bundles, even though there is an "H" in the O&IR page lower border that indicates there should be one attached to the job. She said that she gets the MHIR printouts delivered to her from the Electrical M.E. department, and she just panels what she gets with the appropriate jobs.
So apparently these required MHIRs are being printed in the Electrical M.E. department, but they are being disposed of by them for some reason, and not given to Panel Maintenance for paneling. At least that solves some of the reason why those MHIRs, and the...electrical bonding inspections probably detailed on them, are missing from the panels.
Eureka! Pay dirt. I have been curious about this MHIR designated bond subject since my first days in the Strut Shop several years ago. I have occasionally tried to find the documentation that would prove that my interpretation was right, that we should also inspect these electrical bonds the same way we inspect those bonds with resistance values called out on the drawing (After all, WIRS, (the database) in which the configuration of all BCAG wire bundles are defined by engineering, is, in essence, a drawing unto itself, just in database format, so why wouldn’t a "designated bond" by WIRS dictionary note, be treated any different than a "designated bond" called out on a flag note on a drawing? They are the same animal).
But the closest I got to finding out my interpretation was true was when both my electrical bonding class teachers said that those MHIR notes meant they were designated bonds, like any other designated bond on the drawing.
Of course, that was not enough evidence to get the attention of my management, as they were so disinterested in any inspection requirements, and actually opposed to them in most cases, that nothing short of a "smoking gun" black-and-white document would even make them sit up and take interest.
But I know, by numerous past experiences, that even that would not be enough to make them comply with the requirement, even if I waived it right under their noses. Nothing short of me leading them to a Boeing airplane crash site, past all the still smoldering bodies, and pointing to the source of the crash, a still sparking ground (I know, impossible, but no lesser amount of proof will do) in a strut that had started the explosion that blew up the aircraft when it ignited the fuel from a leaking adjacent fuel tube, would get them to take action.
Even then, perhaps, only the threat of the press finding out about it may make them take appropriate action, once they do the cost-benefit analysis of whether that press coverage, and resulting decreased sales, and the costs of current and future family members of the deceased’s lawsuits, outweighed the costs to fix all of the astronomical numbers of bad critical grounds in the fleet.
Please excuse me for being so cynical, but this opinion is based upon firsthand experience, as I described. My QA Supervisor Tom Nakamichi thinks nothing a line inspector could miss could cause a crash. Let’s hope he’s right (however unlikely that is) for the sake of the people that fly.
The Last Inspector