This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report:
I had previously tried many searches on the Boeing intranet for (this data) to no avail, as that was the WIRS (wiring configuration database) dictionary note I was looking for. The MHIR (Manufacturing (wiring) Hookup and Inspection Record) had already printed out the whole text of what the...note meant from WIRS, so I didn’t need any info from that system. I didn’t have access to that system anyway.
I had requested a WIRS account from my QA supervisor Tom Nakamichi in the last few weeks so I could print out the "missing MHIRs", but that request must have went the way of my "make work" QOIs. Nakamichi probably figured that I didn’t need that account, as I was only a mechanic instructor, not an inspector that would need to use it (he didn’t even give me the courtesy of telling me he was not going to approve my request).
The info on what QA was supposed to do when we saw that note was what I really needed. No QOIs popped up in my searches on the subject. But then, a few days ago, I found document... (the) Bonding and Grounding Design Guide, on the web. In it, in section..., it stated "Design group maintains critical ground list. Critical grounds must be designated to assure verification of bond resistance at each assembly."
So I searched the net for "critical ground"-- and I found it! The "747-400 Critical Grounds Test Requirements" list! It was all there. Every critical ground on the 747, including the many listed on our MHIRs. And what clinches it, is that, in the "Test Requirements" column of the list, the...WIRS note (I was looking for) was listed! (Among others.) I had my "smoking gun" to prove that QA Planning had, in effect, murdered our critical ground inspection requirements.
The Last Inspector