If you are any of the corrupt management of the FAA and Boeing that are involved in the corruption documented on this site, don't start doing a jig or chilling some champagne yet, but your chances of getting away with your fraudulent actions seem to be, unfortunately, a little bit better of late.
Friday, 4-20-07, at approximately 11:36 AM PST, I received a phone call from the DOT OIG Director of Integrity Investigation Services handling my report concerning the fraud ongoing in the Transport Airplane Directorate. It was a welcome call, as I can count on one hand how many phone calls I have had with the OIG office since I submitted my report to them on the fraud going on in the TAD in it's highly biased and intentional oversight of its oversight responsibilities of the Boeing Company's fulfillment of its minimum Production and Type Certificate holder requirements and responsibilities.
It was a call also eerily similar to the prior call I had had with the same person many months ago. In fact, much of the information given to me during the call was the same content as in the prior phone call. It was as if the OIG was in a time warp, and had not progressed on the investigation at all over the past several months. Of course, if true, that would be highly disheartening for everyone except the noted corrupt personnel in the TAD and at Boeing.
If it is true that no progress is being made in stopping the fraud I noted in detail in my reports given to the OIG many months ago, that means during all of the time the OIG chose to give little resources to what should be one of their most important, if not the most important, investigations, Boeing and the TAD have been performing business as usual, certifying aircraft as airworthy when the inspections and tests that form the basis of that crucial determination were never done as required, or were just partially done to an unknown level of integrity.
Also, crucial certification activities have been going on for the new 787 program that will as a consequence have as little validity as those highly questionable airworthiness certifications (considering the TAD's lack of required oversight and the inevitable resulting continuing noncompliances in the noted PAH's "quality system" and certification activities).
Not being a newby to the deep-sixing of investigations both by Boeing and the TAD, this phone call struck a chord that has unfortunately been struck before with me. Justice denied is, of course, justice denied, but justice delayed is also justice denied.
It was surprising how little this Director of Integrity Investigation Services knew about my allegations and the importance of the investigation after this many months. Somewhat incredulous, I asked him what the status of the review/investigation was. He said that the Management Analyst of the Integrity Investigation Services that was my contact at the OIG had written a report analyzing my reports and allegations that I had sent to her and he had had that analysis for quite some time, but he had not read it yet. I became a little more incredulous at the situation. He said that the OIG handled thousands of investigations in response to my stating the import of my particular investigation. Needless to say, he did not win me over on that point.
I was respectful throughout the conversation, but I did try to get some words in edgewise about the importance I thought the investigation should be given by the OIG. He did say he had walked into the Management Analyst's office and had seen a stack of paper a foot to a foot and a half high on her desk that dealt only with my case. I had sent in a lot of material, but not by far that much! He said that some of the material she might have gathered from the FAA. At least that seemed to indicate they were pursuing my case seriously.
Showing as little knowledge about the case as in our prior phone conversation, he went through a range of possible actions they might go forward with with my allegations, one of which was to give the material back to the TAD to do yet another investigation! I told him that that would be a serious mistake, as they had several chances to do their jobs, and each time they refused to do them, and that I had gone as far up the FAA organization as I could in order to get what I witnessed actually investigated.
But, as he had not read the report of the Management Analyst, I suppose his lack of knowledge regarding the case and how it must be handled considering such corrupt personnel was understandable.
We got in a discussion about standards of proof, where I heard what he told me as stating that I had to effectively do the investigation and prove everything myself before they would look into it. He said that I couldn't just "throw stuff at a wall to see what sticks." I told him that my allegations were very detailed, and did not fall into that category. He said that he did know there were some things that I had no access to to bear out my allegations that they would have access to during an investigation--the burden of proof was not as high as I thought at first he was indicating.
He said that he was calling me in response to a request from the Management Analyst that he do so in response to an email I had sent to her in which I had requested that all my privacy rights be waived, as someone had contacted me stating they had contacted one of their state's Senators and the OIG's office, and the Senator had also contacted the OIG office, only to receive a response from the OIG that the OIG could not confirm I had even lodged a complaint with them due to my privacy rights.
We had a discussion about that issue, where it became obvious that the Congressional Senators and Representatives that contacted the OIG needed to request a report on the investigation personally, or the OIG would not apprise them of the investigation report and/or status.
It seemed to me the OIG did not want to disseminate the potential report any more than they had to, which may be a requirement of theirs, I do not know. But now that I have at least verbally waived my privacy rights, those of you who have taken action to protect the safety of yourselves and your loved ones when you fly by contacting your Congressional Representatives and the DOT OIG should receive much more responsive responses, at least from the OIG.
The Director of Integrity Investigation Services was calling me right at the end of his day, so that was pretty much the call. He said he would be contacting me this week to further discuss the case.
So, what do you think? You can contact me by clicking the button in the navigation menu at the top of this page if you have any suggestions on how best to proceed after the above to ensure public safety is ultimately protected and those not performing their critical duties at the FAA are replaced and/or brought to justice.
Even though the content of the call was all in all disappointing, hope is still alive the OIG will do the right thing, eventually, at a date of their own determination, even if it is ultimately too late.
Boeing was concerned I would destroy evidence that I was collecting data, which would apparently take away their right to persecute (I mean, prosecute) me for collecting that data in order to bring them and their "working together in fraud" (as noted on this site) cohorts in the FAA to justice.
Therefore, as it is apparently common investigatory procedure to consider such things, I'm curious as to why the OIG seems to be unconcerned that any of the personnel implicated in wrongdoing in my report to the OIG are destroying evidence themselves while the OIG takes much time, apparently due to their workload and understaffing, to launch their investigation.
There seemed to be almost the presumption of innocence of the TAD (despite all of my allegations) by the noted OIG official even though he had not read the analysis put together for him some time ago about my report, as "the FAA had their own investigators."
So, as the burden of proof does seem to overly protect the guilty in these types of investigations, please contact me with any info you may have regarding inappropriate contacts between FAA officials and Boeing, especially cases where FAA officials have been hired by Boeing (inappropriate pre-employment discussions, violations of no contact periods with their former agencies, bribes, kickbacks, parties, golf excursions, vacations, "exchanging" of gifts, etc.).
Such hiring of FAA officials by Boeing can have vastly more than just the appearance of high impropriety. These types of "quid pro quo" appearing relationships are what I strongly feel are the primary motivating factor in some key FAA personnel only pretending to do their critical to public safety oversight functions. Any related information that you have would be appreciated, if you take the time to let me know about it.
There is at least one high ranking FAA official that was hired directly from the FAA by Boeing during the time (assuming that that time has ended) when Boeing was using such hiring inappropriately (to say the least) to influence action or inaction at the hired employees' former agencies. Of course, I will keep your identity confidential if you choose to contact me with what you know along these lines.
I in no way am suggesting any impropriety in the DOT OIG's investigation of my serious allegations is occurring. Indeed, I hope they take the lead and perform the thorough and effective investigation of the TAD I requested, rooting out all of the corrupt personnel within and once again restoring effective and unbiased oversight of Boeing. But in light of the above, I think it would be imprudent to put "all of the flying public's lives in one basket" in this critical investigation, so I will have another investigatory body look into my allegations while the OIG completes their investigation on their own schedule.
Thankfully, the new Congress seems much more adverse to government and corporate corruption than the last one was. I think it is time now to put that new Congressional ethic to good use--in protecting the safety of those who fly, ensuring the integrity of the FAA's oversight of Boeing, and thereby ensuring other considerations than safety, quality, and reliability do not render certification of the 787 and other Boeing aircraft effectively meaningless.
I'll keep you posted on who I contact and what they propose to do to investigate this fraud, just as I am keeping you up-to-date on the OIG's investigation/review of the TAD.
The TAD proved their own corruption themselves in how they so steadfastly refused to fully investigate my report and take any adverse action against Boeing despite the overwhelming evidence I submitted to them of fraud in Boeing QA Management. They obviously "took a bullet for Boeing" to protect their potential future employer and/or protect their complicity in that fraud from being uncovered during a real investigation.
The OIG already has ample proof of that FAA fraud, and only needs to investigate it as such. As I told the OIG, there are only two possibilities for the TAD's actions--incompetence, or fraud and corruption. As I went through all appropriate channels all the way to the top of the FAA multiple times, no one can conclude the FAA is so incompetent that someone along that long trail did not know how to do their critical jobs--that only leaves one possible reason for their purposeful inaction, and you know what that is.
Thankfully Boeing is doing well financially and competitively, so, even after the shock of this new scandal much bigger in seriousness and scope than the prior Boeing Druyun procurement fraud and the Boeing theft of Lockheed data matters (and more serious than Enron, for that matter), they will survive at least for the sake of their employees, even if the FAA finally makes Boeing follow all Production Certificate and Type Certificate granting requirements once the FAA is restored. Then the FAA can do their jobs with integrity against any noncompliant company, even one as arrogant and powerful and noncompliant as Boeing.
Another fraud of the TAD that has yet to be investigated is the delegation of some former FAA certification oversight functions to Boeing's laughably named "Boeing Delegated Compliance Organization." Because, in my informed experience, compliance is something that Boeing avoids, even though such PR derived organization names falsely imply otherwise.
Instead, Boeing chooses to maintain relationships with biased and corrupt FAA officials that allow noncompliances at Boeing to fester for years, if not forever. These biased and corrupt FAA officials trade the economic benefits of such delay to Boeing for the reduced safety of the public.
The FAA delegated these certification functions to Boeing even though Boeing had not demonstrated they deserved such delegation. It was a goal of the FAA to delegate these oversight functions to Boeing, and so they did it, before any unbiased person would have deemed Boeing ready to be delegated this oversight.
Indeed, the data indicated that the FAA employees who performed this oversight before it was delegated to Boeing for no valid reason were finding high numbers of errors in Boeing certification packages, which would point against delegating these oversight functions to Boeing, and not toward doing so.
More proof that these oversight functions were delegated to Boeing improperly is the fact that the FAA knew Boeing was not ready to perform such oversight. And to reduce the risks associated with the pre-mandated handing over of these oversight functions to Boeing, the FAA handed the oversight over in stages, to programs that would cause the least death and destruction if that Boeing "oversight" failed, to more public safety related programs later.
Somewhat telling of what Boeing's motives were in all of this, they were not satisfied with being delegated the certification oversight functions that would effectively eliminate a layer of oversight by the FAA and substitute Boeing's inherently more biased personnel in their places.
They began leaning the process of certification oversight they were being delegated down to what they judged to be the bare minimum even before they were officially delegated these certification oversight functions. So, whatever part of this former oversight by the FAA that will be left after this "leaning out" of the process by Boeing (even pre-delegation) is anyone's guess.
Another bad consequence of this FAA "delegation without a cause" (except perhaps for the FAA's own internal goals) is that Boeing employees cannot now report concerns to supposedly (bear with me here despite what you've learned on this site) unbiased FAA employees if Boeing is not performing certifications correctly. They instead have to go to a Boeing manager to do so. I bet you can guess how well that fosters communication about such issues, especially when that manager may have approved such hypothetical "deviations" in an organization that seems much more focused on leaning out processes and reaping the resulting reduced costs and efficiencies than actually performing the oversight processes they were delegated.
Indeed, due to the current corrupt FAA oversight of Boeing that can be seen in the above delegation, the FAA cannot be trusted to oversee the integrity of the Boeing Delegated "Compliance" Organization. Another factor against such delegation to Boeing are the FAA's delegation goals that they force themselves to meet irregardless to the level of integrity of the Boeing delegated organization. Plus, the FAA cannot currently be trusted to oversee Boeing's Production Certificate as demonstrated on this site, so they cannot be trusted with any similar delegation function.
What is even more disturbing than how the above certification delegation was given to Boeing and what that shows about the bias of FAA personnel involved is what we don't know. Just how far did this improper delegation proceed after Boeing removed my oversight of the process from the equation? Is Boeing delegated any certification oversight functions on the 787 program? That was their goal, obviously, but did they get what they wanted from the FAA in that regard? Due to the bias and corruption of FAA oversight of Boeing that has yet to be ended by the OIG, I fear Boeing got whatever delegation they wanted for 787 certification oversight functions, whether or not it was warranted by the actual condition of Boeing's internal processes (not the charts about the "health" of those processes that Boeing draws up for FAA consumption, but by the FAA's own independent audits and judgment, if that exists).
So, if you have been wondering why I question the integrity of any forthcoming 787 (and any other Boeing "FAA overseen" programs') certification, you now know a few reasons why, and why I am pessimistic about the program on another page of this site. Of course, the FAA may not have delegated Boeing any of their oversight functions on the 787 Program, which would be good, except for the issue of the FAA's own demonstrated Boeing bias and corruption of its own oversight.
But, with the OIG's help, one day true FAA oversight of Boeing may be restored that does not render every FAA decision questionable when it relates to Boeing, as I have experienced multiple times.
But one thing can be taken at face value (considering that Boeing and the FAA are working way too closely together than should be the case, negating the required unbiased nature of FAA oversight)--everything Boeing and the FAA say on this issue must be viewed through the prism of past FAA/Boeing corruption documented on this site, and given the appropriate weight (if any) accordingly.
Today's Daily Report Quote:
This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report, and refers to a requirement in the Boeing QA Manual:
Manual retests: I dug up the procedure I was referencing in my original letter. It was the (document number) document, which on page 14, section III.D. states that "verify" identifies operations requiring an inspection buy-off for that process.
It turns out that those three tests I inspected on the RM245 POS 4 EBU (Turbofan Engine Build-Up) were the only manual functional tests ever done correctly at PSD! Any manual tests that do not have an inspection stamp opposite the verify operation have been bought without a required process inspection done.
This proves these tests were not witnessed as described, because the inspector is supposed to stamp the "verify" operation as they witness the correct test outcome. Have completed records pull all the manual tests they have in onsite or offsite completed records and have PSD notify the customers that they need to perform the mandatory inspections on those tests that PSD did not.
Our QA management may claim ignorance of this requirement. Don’t buy it. They did it by design, omitting all the requirements they could from our QA manual so they could save the Company money by not complying with them. They omitted the whole required QOI (Quality Operating Instruction) for functional testing purposely from the manual for this reason.
That doesn’t absolve us, however, from having to comply with all relevant documents, even if we have to dig them up, as I did with the noted document, due to our lack of a QOI that would put all of this information into one easy to find place where lowly line inspectors like me could read them and comply with them.
This is just another example where our QA Management has ensured that the line inspector’s ignorance of inspection requirements is blissfully translated into more bottom line dollars for BCAG.
Another case where shop is performing tests without inspections is on the 737NG EBU fire detection system. They check the fire loop for a certain resistance reading, like 868 ohms, plus or minus some value, on job N93250 (L/N 1096), operation 190. The operation is titled a continuity test, but if that was the case, there would be no inspection operation and no ohmmeter would be required for the test. This should be witnessed or "verified," by the inspector checking the resistance himself. But it doesn’t happen. A "verify" inspection is in operation 190, just like there is F/T (Functional Test) paperwork for some engines, but we just take shop’s word that the test was done, without the required inspections.
This just in (it’s 3/11/02): I was doing an NCR (Non-Conformance Record) search last week for a specific NCR when I stumbled across a few NCRs in which I had written shop up for the same thing, lack of required witnesses on manual tests trying to be sold as "verified" only, some years ago. Reference NCRs N1810002283 and N1810002284. I believe they were written on the same functional test mechanic’s work as the recent ones were--(name). They were probably also similarly roller stamped on second shift also. These old NCRs prove that this problem (uninspected roller stamped tests) has been going on for a very long time at PSD.
The Last Inspector