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5-28-2007 Daily Eastman Report to the FAA Quote

5/28/2007

 

This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report:

The rework NCRs I wrote prior to abandoning writing pickups for such missing inspections (per the QOI requirements) at management direction in order to perform the process per my QA supervisor Tom Nakamichi's undocumented method of writing IRCRs (Inspection Record Change Requests) for such planning errors, which "support the delivery schedule" by not holding up the delivery of uninspected critical torques on jet engines:

...(NCR and IRCR list)...

This is being written on 4/16/02, two days after the above. Well, it really hit the fan yesterday (monday). 

(My QA Lead) brought me the IRCRs I had written and told me that I needed to mark up a copy of the jobs to tell QA Planning where to add the buyoffs and attach them to the IRCRs and return them. This is even more "non-value added" to the requirements of our IRCR QOI, 060-002. There is no such requirement in the QOI.

QA Planners are supposed to decide where and if a buyoff gets put on a job, and should be theoretically capable of doing that most basic part of their jobs.

And I had put on at least one of the IRCRs exactly where on the job the buyoffs were needed. 

(My QA Lead) still told me to attach...marked up copies of the jobs to even that IRCR. Naturally, I agreed to do as directed, after I had finished an NCR I was working on. (My QA Lead) was O.K. with that. (My QA Lead) also told both me and (name), the other line inspector working in the area, not to write pickups as I had done to hold the jobs open while the IRCRs were being processed.

He said that, on the ones I had written, we were supposed to witness the torques, document that we witnessed the torques on info pickups, then buy all the pickups off so they wouldn’t hold the jobs up.

This was all per my QA supervisor Tom Nakamichi's direction, I believe. (My QA Lead) also said that Nakamichi was livid that I had "held the jobs hostage" by writing the info pickups on them to keep them open.

That was not anything 
my QA supervisor Tom Nakamichi told us to do. He had just wanted us to write the IRCRs and forget about them, and forget about the jobs having to be changed. Nakamichi may sign them and pass them on to QA Planning, or he might not. QA Planning, if they get them, may process them this year, or not ever.

The IRCRs I had written Friday had never been signed by 
Nakamichi and submitted to QA Planning in an expedited fashion so that the jobs would be revised in time to be finished before second shift Monday, when the EBUs were supposed to ship. He had just held them until half of Monday was over and then had (my QA Lead) kick them back to me under some bogus pretense of marking up jobs. 

My QA Supervisor Tom Nakamichi was evidently getting some pressure from shop to get the situation resolved. I believe shop was just going to travel the pickups, making me out to be the bad guy for holding those jobs up with the pickups.

I heard later that Nakamichi, (name), our Director, (another QA supervisor) , and maybe (even another QA supervisor) were having heated discussions on the subject of holding the jobs up for processing of the IRCRs. The gist I heard of these discussions from (the other 777 EBU line inspector) and (my QA Lead) was that these meetings focused on me being an "asshole" by doing what I did, and the lament of "how could he do such a thing," and what they were going to do about it.
(One of the other QA supervisors) was asking why we were writing up planning at all.

As I went about continuing to inspect in the area, a steady parade of people came up to peruse the jobs on the engine I was working that I had hung pickups on holding them open until the IRCRs were processed. (Name), QA Lead, was one, and he was not even lead of the 777 EBU area, (name) was. (One of the other QA supervisors), whose function right now I am not sure about, as he said (another QA supervisor) was now the QA Planning Supervisor, also came up.

​I told him what (my QA Lead) had said that us line inspectors were supposed to do--witness the torques, document it on pickups, and buy the pickups off so the jobs would not be held up. He agreed that that was the plan. I talked to him about the subject of what we were supposed to do if we found witness torques on the drawing in the future that were not on the plans. He said we should do nothing, as the BCAG torque witness plan was still not complete. I told him that I had heard that BCAG was supposed to have all the plans in compliance to have QA witness all drawing designated torques at the end of last year. He said that was not true, and that there was no compliance date. I told him that I was just doing what my QA supervisor Nakamichi had said in our crew meeting that we were supposed to do (less the writing the pickup to hold the job open part). He said that management owed me an answer to the IRCRs and that the issue would probably be raised at the Quality Council.


Anyway, later that day, my QA supervisor Tom Nakamichi came up and got the IRCRs from me. He asked me if I had witnessed any of the torques that I had written up the lack of inspections for on the IRCRs. I said no. Shop had not grabbed either me or (the other 777 EBU inspector) to do that at that point. Shop didn’t have to either, ever, as no inspections were yet added to the jobs, as the IRCRs were not yet processed at that point to add the inspections to the jobs.

Today, I found out through (my QA Lead) that my QA Supervisor Nakamichi had bought the above noted rework NCRs off stating that the IRCRs had been turned in and were being worked. (My QA Lead) also said that the IRCRs were still sitting on (another QA supervisor's) desk and that she was refusing to work them. The EBUs had shipped last night. (My QA Lead) told (the other 777 EBU inspector) and I, that for any jobs on the new unit we were starting today that were missing torque inspections, to write an info pickup documenting we witnessed the torques, then to write an IRCR to get the inspections added to the job and hold all of these IRCRs until the EBU build was complete, and then turn them in all at once.

It seems QA lacks the guts any more to hold any jobs up from being bought, even for lack of critical torque inspections.



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    The Last Inspector
    Gerald Eastman

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  • The Last Inspector's Blog
  • The Boeing-FAA "Working Together" Fraud Negating Boeing Airplane Quality
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  • Boeing's Vast Network of Fraud
  • Other Boeing Fraud
  • Troubling Facts about Boeing's Culture of Fraud
  • Jump Page
  • About/Contact Me
  • Crashes Because of Rollerstamping
  • What is Rollerstamping?
  • New Fraud, Same as the Old Fraud
  • Boeing Workers Agree: Only Fly on Boeing Planes if you Have a Death Wish