I haven't covered much about my own personal situation for trying in vain to protect the public. My failure, of course, is not for lack of trying. Both Boeing and the FAA blocked my attempts at ending their symbiotic corruption.
Anyway, I'm still unemployed after over a year of being kicked out on the streets by Boeing because I was attempting to bring them to justice. I have applied at many jobs, however I appear to be blacklisted from my occupation. Surprising? No. Not much surprises me anymore, especially when it comes to what Boeing and its government agencies do.
I am not very legally savvy, but it has been a year and a couple weeks since I was arrested at the dishonest request of Boeing. With a three year statute of limitations on any supposed crimes I committed in trying to protect public safety, I guess I have a little less than two years until the cloud Boeing has placed over me as retaliation is lifted as far as potential criminal charges go.
Frankly, I don't expect I will ever be charged with any crime as a result of my arguably false arrest at Boeing's request. Over a year has passed, and even though technically almost two years remain in which I can be charged, there are several reasons to doubt any charges will ultimately be filed as Boeing retaliatorily wishes.
First, any case against me would not be a complex case requiring as much time as has elapsed since my arrest. The prosecutor's office themselves thought so, only sealing the records stating the reasoning for my arrest and my possessions being searched for six months, which they stated would be more than adequate. Even though they extended the seal by submitting, questionably, the same arguments to the judge (which had to have changed over the six months) for doing so that were originally presented after the six months expired, I don't think that indicates their steadfast adherence to Boeing's wishes that the book be thrown at me for daring to expose the crimes of Boeing's elite.
To charge me after all of this time, although possible, would show that the prosecutor's office is beholden to this pressure from Boeing, and is looking much harder than they thought they would be looking for a reason to charge me in order to please Boeing Management. Of course, all of this time may have elapsed because they want to ensure they legally "burn me at the stake" per Boeing's request by charging me with as many charges as they possibly can for my whistleblowing and attempted public lifesaving activities, thereby pleasing Boeing as much as they possibly can. But I don't think the public would want that, and they would want instead that ultimately the wheels of justice turn to protect the public as I was doing, and do not turn to protect corruption at corporations, no matter what their size.
That's enough about this line of thought for today.
This item should be very interesting, however, to you:
Showing that Boeing did in fact want to persecute me by prosecuting me, I learned that Boeing had caught someone doing the same thing that I was allegedly doing--leaking stories to the press. This person had been leaking information about Boeing's competition sensitive and highly secret plans for their moving production lines in Renton to the press.
What did Boeing do to this "leaker" as they essentially did the same thing as I allegedly did, except without any possible motive of protecting public lives? Boeing gave them five days off without pay! Nope. No arrest. No termination. Just a leisurely five day unpaid vacation and they were back at work.
What did I get for the same alleged offense when Boeing knew I was trying to protect public and military lives by doing what I did? They had me falsely arrested by never telling the police about my whistleblower status. They indefinitely suspended me, then the V.P. of BCA's H.R. department approved my termination. They have been attempting to have me charged for a crime since, with some difficulty for obvious reasons.
So, I think you'll agree with me that I've just proven Boeing's actions against me were intentionally unjust, and just retaliation for my daring to expose the real crimes of their management that I later reported to them, and who they promptly promoted and are still protecting with the full resources of the Boeing Company. It is my opinion they did so so the noted management would not tell what they knew about Boeing's conduct to authorities, and instead would side against me, and the truth.
Just Another Day in Torture-Ville
Thank God for the ACLU. I know some will disagree because the ACLU takes unpopular stands sometimes in its zealous defense of our liberties. But with government agencies and some corporations routinely breaking the law, it seems it is up to organizations such as the ACLU to protect us from those abuses, instead of the government agencies that were set up to do so, but aren't, or in some cases, like the FAA as noted on this site, are doing the opposite of their mandated duties to protect us.
'ACLU attorney Ben Wizner said Jeppesen (a Boeing subsidiary) could not have been ignorant of the purpose of CIA flights. (Seems like a big "Duh" to me).
"Either they knew or reasonably should have known that they were facilitating a torture program," he said. (Ditto. The Boeing manager in the Board meeting as noted in the New Yorker article certainly seems to have made the connection. Funny (or not so funny) thought. Boeing used to have a startup called "Connexion by Boeing" that has shut down or is in the process of doing so. It's purpose was to provide broadband services to airline passengers. However, since it is/has been shutting down, the name is freed up for other use. Wouldn't it be a good name for the "torture flights" for the government by Boeing subsidiary Jeppeson? Instead of the (rightly) ominous sounding "torture flights" default name, as they apparently have not named this service as they didn't expect it to go public, they could just re-use the Connexions by Boeing moniker for them. Then they could make up nice glossy brochures with the branding for their customers for this service with hooded and shackled suspected terrorists boarding and deplaning aircraft, on their way to being tortured until they admit they are terrorists (of course, that part is the customer's business, I guess it wouldn't be mentioned in the brochures.) Maybe "Torture Connexion by Boeing" wouldn't be kosher from a P.R. or liability standpoint should the public get hold of one of these hypothetical brochures. Anyway, this situation doesn't lend itself to comedy, as I've just proven.)
"Companies are not allowed to have their head in the sand and take money from the CIA to fly people, hooded and shackled, to foreign countries to be tortured," Wizner said.
The lawsuit charges that Jeppesen knowingly provided direct flight services to the CIA that enabled the clandestine transportation of the men to secret overseas locations.
The ACLU claims the men were tortured there and subjected to other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (Hey, I know intimately that kind of treatment from my years at Boeing where I was harassed and retaliated against for doing my job, albeit mostly not in a physical way as perhaps these men were) under the agency's extraordinary rendition program.
The CIA will not be named in the lawsuit; Wizner said the executive branch has evoked a state secrets defense in similar lawsuits. The Bush administration has insisted it receives guarantees from countries receiving terror suspects that prisoners will not be tortured. (Can you believe that last part?--Me neither. If the foreign government promised they wouldn't torture them, then why the hell were they flown over there at all on private jets? Seems like a waste of tax dollars to me. We could have interrogated them here if, as the Bush Administration says, they weren't treated more harshly over there. If that's true, maybe they weren't "torture flights" at all, but were just little vacations from their harsh interrogations here because we felt for them and wanted to give them Middle Eastern all expenses paid vacations to refresh them for further interrogations. I guess that's one thing you can infer if you believe what the administration said.)'
End of article quote.
Today's Daily Report Quote:
This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report.
This section documents the lack of concern by Key Engineers about safety device issues and the fact that budget matters trump safety at Boeing, even in the most obvious safety related areas, such as safety device integrity. I believe this safety device specification issue was partially fixed just months before my termination, some six years after I formally brought it to the attention of the appropriate engineering department.
This was well after Boeing corporate management and the FAA had refused to fix it on the multiple occasions I notified them of it. I believe the change that partially fixed this critical problem that allowed untold numbers of defective (insufficient strength) critical safety devices to deliver to BCA customers with the full knowledge of Boeing and the FAA occurred when a new Key Engineer was assigned to the spec. As this is a long section, I will break it up and quote it over the next few days:
Please investigate BCAG Engineering’s hesitancy to fix obvious errors in their specifications, even those of critical items to the aircraft like safety devices, in order to "save costs."
It seems BCAG Engineering is similarly corrupted from doing their jobs, like Quality is. Every .020" diameter safety cable installation Boeing has ever installed has been discrepant per the BAC5018 spec. I brought this to the attention of the "keeper of the spec", (name), on 8/16/99 by going through the official procedures to get it fixed, submitting a RDR form to him (Exhibit Y attached). They logged it as RDR No. R99-0422, and in their system as B-YC00-A6M-R99-0422.
The RDR had to do with section 11.e. of three of the PSDs (Process Specification Departures) (PSD 6-37, PSD 6-38, and PSD 6-41) to the spec that were out at the time, and are probably still out, that had a caution note that the die indentation from the installation tool was to extend a minimum of (dimension) inch from the outer end of the ferrule for all safety cable, .020" diameter, .030" diameter, and .040" diameter.
The problem is that the length of a ferrule for .020" safety cable is only .087"-.095" long before installation. This makes inspecting per the caution note impossible, as all .020" safety cable installations will fail the requirement.
Big deal, you say, the spec also requires that a test be done everyday for each tool that is used to install that diameter safety cable, requiring a representative installation done with that tool to pass a minimum amount of torque on a test fixture before that tool can be used to install any .020" diameter safety cable.
That will ensure that we have a good .020" diameter safety cable installation every time, even though the spec is hosed up. Wrong. That note was put there because, even though you do the test every day and it passes, the use of the tool to install a real safety cable installation on the aircraft requires skill due to the tight spaces on the A/P that are not represented by the required testing with the tool that is bolted to the table surface in the unconfined space out in the shop, and the installation tool can easily slip or be miss-positioned during the crimp, resulting in a crimp that is way shorter, and therefore not as strong, as the one that is done right every time on the tool due to ease of access.
This results in a discrepant safety cable installation on the A/P that will not withstand the minimum test forces, and cannot be tested on the A/P without destroying it, and will probably fail in service. A perfect, maximum length with perfect tool use, .020" safety cable ferrule crimp is only about half the (minimum dimension) required length in the spec.
Therefore every .020" diameter safety cable installation will fail the spec requirements, which are bogus for .020" diameter safety cable, but what is worse than that is this: I have given "verbal pickups" several times to different mechanics to change out .030" diameter safety cable installations in which the ferrule crimp was not the minimum...length, and would have likely failed in service (ask (name), APU mechanic for proof).
How do I write up a similarly discrepant .020" diameter safety cable crimp that will fail in service? I can’t. The requirement in the spec is bogus, and even good installations fail the requirement. But what should the requirement be? That’s what I need in the spec in order to judge whether a particular .020" diameter safety cable crimp is OK or not. Right now, I can’t write up even extremely short crimps that are obviously discrepant on .020" safety cable installations, unless maybe if I touch it and the ferrule falls off of the cable, as there are no valid inspection criteria in BAC5018.