This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report.
A second example of this problem is on the 737 EBU line. The exhaust plug is installed in two parts, a forward plug section and an aft plug section. The forward plug section is installed to the engine and the torque on the attaching fasteners is inspected. Then the aft section of the plug is installed with no "OK to Install" inspection on the job (see O&IR (I.D. number)). Hence, over two thousand 737 engines have went out without the closed off portion of the forward plug, and the fasteners that attach the entire plug to the engine, inspected.
True, I believe all of the fasteners were inspected for torque on the O&IRs, but the fasteners themselves were never inspected. Mechanics could have put incorrect low-temp nuts and washers on, resulting in cracking of the nuts in service, and departure of the plug. They could have put too many washers on, resulting in not enough protrusion of the stud through the nut, resulting in the same departure of the plug in service. Who knows, they could have done anything in there.
Maybe there used to be an "OK to Install" inspection for the aft plug, I don’t remember if there was one during the time I was on that line. I believe I used to try to look in there to inspect the fastener installation, but I don’t really remember. I would have if there was an inspection for it.
(I can vouch that, many months after this was written, there still was no "OK to install" inspection for the aft section of the plug after the forward section was installed, as I was assigned to the 737 line as retaliation for turning Boeing in to the FAA after my job was eliminated at Flight Test because I was actually doing the job there (another long and sad story about corrupt BCA management in itself). They also hoped that I would not rollerstamp there as was required in the Boeing quality system and I would then get way behind, at which time they hoped to fire me under the pretense I was not getting the job done, albeit I would really be fired for actually trying to inspect these engines as required which are at the center of the current investigation of the Kenya Airways flight 507 crash that killed all 114 people on board. My boss actually started down the road to doing this as I refused to rollerstamp as they knew I would, and he started disciplinary action against me by comparing by "productivity" with the most notorious rollerstamper on our inspection crew, which I worked with at the time. Of course, by productivity, all my corrupt manager compared was how fast the other inspector rollerstamped the jobs off as compared to how fast I stamped them off (after actually inspecting the work on the engine). It wasn't a comparison of how much work we actaully did and how well we did our jobs at all. I actually worked much, much harder than the other inspector I was compared with. I did the most inspection I thought I could get away with without losing my job before I stamped the jobs off, which entailed actually looking at in detail with mirror and flashlight all of the work I was buying off, although there was never time to look at drawings or to ensure the correct configuration parts were actually installed. I also ensured the defects I found were reworked and NCRs were written on defects that needed engineering disposition before rework/repair. However, none of this work was mandatory even though it was required per our FAA approved quality system, or in fact was done in most cases by the other notoriously rollerstamping inspector I was compared with only on a "throughput" (get the garbage out the door, as a coworker described it) basis in just this one of many obvious attempts by my QA management to retaliate against me for turning their crimes into their employees at the FAA).
Our management will probably try to get inspectors together in order to have them assure you that they inspected in there, even though they didn’t have to per the paperwork. Don’t believe them. While even having an inspection on a job and stamped off by shop and QA does not ensure that inspection was actually done at PSD, or BCAG for that matter, that paper is all we’ve really got to go on, regardless of its validity. Hold PSD to it. If a required closure inspection is missing, have BCAG put out the necessary service bulletins to have the installation inspected to ensure safety. While I don’t think, from my limited knowledge of engine operating conditions, that an exhaust plug departing from the airplane could cause it to crash, it could hurt quite a lot if it hit you on the head, along with hurting Boeing’s cherished reputation.
The aft plug doesn’t have to be removed for inspection. A borescope put into the aft plug opening could make for a quick and accurate inspection on a service bulletin. Once again, don’t let BCAG do an engineering analysis on this and try to convince you a fleet inspection is not necessary. Make them do it in any event, if only for a very instructive learning experience that will show them that deleting required inspections to "facilitate the delivery schedule" and save costs, will only cost them more money than they would ever have saved by deleting the inspections, and the inspectors that do the inspections, in the end.
It would also motivate us to make sure the required inspections are on the jobs for no other purpose than avoiding the embarrassment that results to BCAG when such a service bulletin is released, that lets customers in on the true state of our inspection system.
The Last Inspector