This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report. (Continued from previous day's quote):
Nope, that one instance was not the end of this problem. (The inspector) said this problem (holes too big for safety cable or even safety wire per (the spec), allowing safeties to be ineffective) exists on EBUs (Engine Build-Ups) on the 747/767 line. He used to have 747/767 EBU mechanics install safety wire in places where safety cable was optional to the safety wire on the drawing, because the holes the safety device had to go through were too big for safety cable per the spec, but were OK for safety wire.
Now he doesn’t worry about it, as (our QA supervisor) said "it was designed that way." It seems PSD engineers, the engineers of some of the most complex hardware anywhere, don’t know how to pick the right size of safety device for the hole.
Please review all PSD drawings with safety devices, and tell our management to immediately fix by NCR or advance drawing change, whichever is fast enough to prevent discrepant products from getting into service, any installations with the noted discrepancy (for both safety cable and safety wire.
I don’t know, offhand, what the maximum hole sizes for different safety wire diameters are per (the spec). I’m pretty sure the (design manual) states the same requirements. Make them treat it as safety of flight, as they probably should have. Then make us put out the necessary SBs or ADs to fix the discrepant safety devices in the fleet.
Some references:See the revision B block of (drawing I.D.) sheet 60, which changed the .XXX" diameter safety cable hole in the (part number) detail of the (part number) bracket to .XXX"-.XXX" diameter. Revision C changed it back to .XXX" to .XXX" diameter, with a "must comply" urgency.
The same thing happened with the (part number) detail of the (part number) bracket on sheet 13.---Why didn’t the same thing happen for the (part noted above that our QA supervisor interfered with fixing)? Corruption of our management.
The Last Inspector