This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report. (Continued from previous day's quote. These quotes should explain more why I dubbed myself "The Last Inspector". This ciritcal to safety problem only I found after approximately 382 inspections of the same job by other "inspectors." This overlooked defect, or a similar one, I believe, could have led to an accident similar to the TWA800 accident. And, as far as I know, the FAA ignored my asking them to ensure it was fixed in the fleet.):
Another example, but dealing with critical wire bundle to fuel tube clearance on 747 (vendor) struts: When I was assigned on the 747 strut line I wrote NCR (number) on 747 unit L/N (number) for insufficient clearance between a wire bundle and an adjacent fuel tube, the X" diameter fuel tube that supplies all of the fuel to the engine. The clearance should have been a minimum of X" , but was about half that minimum (yes, I know that should have been easily visible to any inspectors eyes, regardless of calibration, but you only see what you want, or think you are allowed, to see--Do you get a sense of deja vu just now, or is it just me? (I like copy and paste, obviously)). This was clearly a safety of flight issue (to me) as the wire bundle was above the fuel tube, and the fuel tube was well supported from movement, but the wire bundle, which had never obviously been inspected for minimum clearance to that fuel tube, was not. An unknown clearance, or even riding condition, existed on all prior units, as they could never had been built with the minimum 2" clearance due to design error. What’s worse is that the clearance between the wire bundle and the fuel tube would only get worse over time in this high vibration area, as the wire bundle would droop more and more over time due to gravity, loosening and migration of wire bundle ties, and possible axial movement of the wire bundle forward through the clamp just aft of the area, making the drooping worse. A drawing change resulted from my tag (see PI drawing (number) sheet 1 zone C10 flag note AL and revision D block of PI). I believe the installation I wrote up originally was approximately the 383rd installation inspected prior to the write up of this design error that made attaining the minimum drawing required clearances impossible. Please check to see if BCAG issued a service bulletin to inspect for the minimum X" clearance allowed by the drawing change so no fires result in the fleet, although I believe an AD would be more appropriate for this problem.
The Last Inspector