This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report, This corruption at Boeing bodes ill for the 787 program, I believe. Customers should hope their 787s are not damaged at Boeing and have to be repaired and "inspected" by these Boeing personnel:
All the repairs were made with (material specification) material and should have been made with the drawing and composite repair document required (material specification) material. Please have BCAG send the necessary documentation to the airlines for the airlines to disposition these faulty repairs. Please do not let BCAG do some "global buyoff" by just reviewing these tags in house, that results in no notification to the airlines. I hope that this report of mine, and your investigation and corrective action requirements will result in the pulling up of the BCAG airplane, figuratively, that is currently in a death spiral toward the ground because of BCAG’s belief in, and use of their unwritten Quality System (basically no Quality System at all would be as poorly effective), instead of the FAA-approved Quality System. The only way to wake the pilots that control this Company up is to slap them, and slap them as hard as possible, to wake them up so they will right this "airship." By the way, I have the two "missing from the NCM system" (number) forms (at work) if you need to see them. Only the first tag listed in the table had a cure printout scanned into NCM, and it showed insufficient thermocouples monitored for inspection and no vacuum applied, if I remember right. Please get a composite repair expert to look into all the composite repair NCRs done at BCAG in at least the past year to look for similar noncompliances with procedures to get approval from engineering and stress for alterations to established composite repair processes (illegal repairs), and to view scanned in cure printouts for discrepant cures. Please write us up for, what I’m sure will be many, noncompliances during these critical repairs, and ensure BCAG reviews all composite repair NCRs or R/Ts (rejection tags) in the past and notifies airlines that may be flying airplanes with bad composite repairs. Also, require that all inspectors that accept any composite repairs attend a class and be certified annually. While lack of certification of inspectors for composite repairs is not the cause of the above problems--roller stamping and bypassing of ethical inspectors is--certification will increase the knowledge level of all inspectors on composite repair inspection requirements and remove the incompetence excuse from the tool bag of inspectors who roller stamp these inspections.
The Last Inspector