This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report, This corruption at Boeing bodes ill for the 787 program, I believe. Customers should hope their 787s are not damaged at Boeing and have to be repaired and "inspected" by these Boeing personnel:
Another 737NG T/R (Thrust Reverser) was reworked at PSD in the last few weeks by (name), Renton EMF Composites composite repair technician. You probably recognize his name, as it is in the table above. The lay-up repair on the NCR that did the repair, (number), was also done with the wrong material, (material specification), and had only one thermocouple monitored on the printout during the repair, just as all of his prior repairs to 737 T/Rs had. There was one major difference between this most recent repair and all of the prior repairs in which he used the wrong material without the required engineering or stress approval---this one was done after NCR (number), in which I wrote his repair up for using the wrong material and not having enough data to inspect the cure, and after which he went and got (my QA Lead) to roller stamp his work off. When I told him he had used the wrong material on NCR (number), had to write a revision to the tag to get it approved, that, at that point, was simply an error, I might believe. But what do you call it when a person intentionally does something wrong to an airplane again, as was done by him on NCR (number), after he was warned it was wrong previously, as he was on NCR (number)? Right--sabotage. (Another QA Lead) bought the (number) tag on 1/31/02.
This just in: More sabotage: Another 737NG T/R was reworked at PSD last week by (name) (it is 3/11/02 when I am writing this), and the wrong material was used again without required Engineering and Stress approvals. Reference NCR (number) on the (Part Number and Serial Number) T/R.
The Last Inspector