This quote is also from my addendum (supplement) to my first report (continued from previous day's quote):
Let’s take the (next) lie by our management that "justified" omitting QA witnessing of leak-proof torques at PSD, "that there are too few inspectors at PSD." There are really not that many of these leak-proof connections on an individual strut or engine, as our management probably told engineering and will probably tell you. Have them count the few hundred critical fastener torques that we witness on an EBU (Engine Build-Up), then have them count the number of leak-proof connections we torque on that same EBU. The number of critical leak-proof connections we torque will probably be less, and in fact, much less, than the number of critical fastener torques we witness on an EBU. How much extra time does it take for QA to witness a torque than if a mechanic does it without witness?
Almost no extra time. Is only thirty seconds more for the mechanic to call the inspector too much to ask to increase the safety of the people on our airplanes, and the safety of mechanics at Prime Divisions that have deal with the spewing connections we left loose at PSD, that did not wait to fail in service? They will probably try to tell you "just look at the big picture"--thirty seconds on each connection would equal a huge amount of profit loss for the Company. Except shop does not torque just individual connections in a system, then one more later. They are supposed to torque all connections in a system at the end of installing that plumbing system, not to just install one tube at a time. (Our QA supervisor) told us in our...crew meeting that recently seven gallons of hydraulic fluid leaked from a B-Nut (tubing) connection to the hydraulic pump during a wet run of an EBU at Prime Division that supposedly was a witness torque at PSD. Whether it was a witness torque or not, or whether it was loosened after inspection at PSD is anyone’s guess. (Our QA supervisor) seemed to imply it was a QA escape, but I know anything (our QA supervisor) says in crew meetings should probably be taken with a grain of salt, unless it jibes with his true unethical BCAG QA Supervisor nature. He only speaks the truth to us individually, behind closed doors. Of course, what he said may have been true, and one of his "trained to roller stamp" inspectors may have bought that torque, if such a witness on that connection existed. I have personally had to re-witness witness torques on hydraulic pump unions on the 747/767 EBU line, where a PSD roller stamping inspector, (name), Lead Inspector, had "witnessed" the torques, that were not obviously, by visual inspection, completely torqued, and would have similarly leaked at (Prime Division, in this case the Everett factory). The current ineffectiveness of our management trained roller stamping inspectors is no reason to let these critical 0 AQL leak-proof torques go uninspected. The effectiveness of our Quality System will ultimately be restored, if you investigate per this report. I believe these torques can be done with only the current inspection force, if they are made what they should be--a witness. So what if I’m slightly off and they have to hire even one more inspector? Is the lack of their extra pay by their absence, due to the possible maintaining of the current lie-gotten "non-witness" leakproof torque system at PSD, worth the lives of hundreds at a crash? Maybe to our management, but not to me. So much for the "there are too few inspectors at PSD" lie.
The Last Inspector