This quote is also from the 11/24/02 letter I wrote to Nicholas Sabatini, Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, to try and get an objective investigation of my report done for the public's sake:
I should have been suspicious when (name), Senior ASI at the MIDO, told me early in the investigation that they would investigate my "specific allegations" in my report (I had not made any "non-specific allegations" in my report. In fact, my report was chock full of specifics!). He also said that they did not investigate what he termed "personnel problems." I felt that was not directed at me or my report, as I had detailed what any casual observer could consider crimes and corruption impinging upon the safety of our airplanes, not mere "personnel problems." Still, I was suspicious enough to ask if they could involve the FBI and Justice Department if need be. He was evasive, but eventually said that they had done so at least once in the past at the MIDO.
I had hoped that all I would have to do was to submit my report to the MIDO, and they would do the rest ethically, thoroughly, and with integrity. I was hoping they were the "one stop shopping place" that 14CFR13 seems to indicate, and would coordinate with the FBI and Justice Department as necessary during their investigation, making my further involvement with rectifying the corruption in the Quality System at BCAG unnecessary. However, I was horribly mistaken, it seems. Due to the apparent failure of the MIDO to fully investigate the items in my report, it appears the ball is now back in my court.
I had written my report as a "self contained" primer that I thought, and still think, could easily restore the BCAG Quality System by only doing an honest investigation and corrective actions therefrom. In the end, if the investigation was performed ethically and thoroughly, all corruption in the BCAG Quality System should be routed out.
How did the TAD’s investigation of my report get derailed as described above? I don’t know, specifically. I only have suspicions that will ultimately need corroboration. A clue perhaps, can be found on the TAD’s website. According to the website, the TAD advances safety "by providing the highest quality (customer) service." Sending their customers to jail or doing anything their customers would not approve of would not fit in with that philosophy of "customer service," no matter how corrupt their "customer" happened to be. Another clue is, apparently, even though in the addendum to my report I requested the MIDO not to protect my identity if it would impede their investigation in any way, it appears that they may have intentionally ignored that request in order, not to protect me, but to use such "protection" of my identity as a convenient excuse in order to not investigate the more serious items detailed in my report, for whatever reason.
The MIDO’s attempt(s) to protect my identity by not investigating certain items does not make sense to me. When I agreed to let them protect my identity if possible after submitting the first part of my report, I was not told they intended to do so by only investigating items they thought would not give away my identity. If I knew they were going to do that, I would not have had them protect my identity at all. I had just wanted them not to tell BCAG outright that it was me that had submitted the report. I did not care if BCAG figured it out on their own via the items the MIDO was investigating. I specifically requested that the MIDO not protect my identity in any way in my addendum to my report to prevent that "process" again from impeding the investigation in any way. However, it appears the MIDO may have attempted to protect my identity again despite my request, judging by the meager list of items they confirmed in the investigation. Of course, there may be some other explanation.
The Last Inspector