This quote is from the letter I wrote to the FAA TAD manager Nicholas Sabatini, Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, assigned to "investigate" my report. I didn't complete it prior to the August 2003 letter I received givimg the "final results" of the TAD's "investigation," an investigation which was only carefully done in one area--to state in the letter that they had investigated each item I reported, when they in fact had not even remotely done so. I knew that as I had access to the letters the FAA wrote to Boeing with the minimal findings they chose to document from my report, and evidence of the badly and obviously intentionally mishandled verification by the TAD that Boeing fixed in any way even those minimal--but serious for the safety of passengers and crew aboard Boeing airplanes--findings. Due to three occasions of the FAA intentionally quashing any real investigation of my report to protect Boeing's ability to increasingly not comply with its Production Certificate in order to maximize "value added" activities that maximize profits, and eliminate and/or not comply with (even if legally required) "non-value added" activities, such as they consider actual quality assurance of airplane production required by Boeing's Production Certificate, I did not submit this letter to the FAA or Boeing. In addition to the OIG, you are the first to read this letter:
I haven’t seen any MIDO investigators in Flight Test yet, but (name) has been much more visible, I guess, than he usually is at Flight Test. I guess/suppose that is in response to my letter to Mr. Sabatini about the controversial AML process being used in Flight Test QA. It is (name's) signature that is on our Repair Station Certificate, so I know of his importance and knowledge in that area.
To prove this, for what it’s worth, several weeks ago I witnessed a conversation between my Lead, (name), and (name), a Flight Test Airworthiness Inspector. They were adjacent to my desk in the Flight Test QA Lead office. It was 6:25 AM on April 29th (yes, I do keep copious notes of such events). (name) was working on getting some information (name) had requested, I believe, on the recent letter check of Boeing’s Connexions A/P that had been done at the former (name) (now (name)) facility in Everett. The airplane had just returned to Flight Test after the check and (name) was going over the paperwork to see if everything was kosher, I guess. During the discussion with (name) of what (name) was doing for (name), (name) wondered aloud what had prodded (name's) frequent visits lately to Flight Test. He said he "hadn’t seen him for months" prior to his recent visits. (name) and (name) came to the conclusion it must have had something to do with the AML process in place at Flight Test, which I have frequently witnessed is a frequent topic of discussion and disgust among Flight Test Airworthiness Inspectors and their Leads. I agree with their suspicions. However I believe I have a bit more detail than (name) and (name) on the impetus behind (name's) recent visits to Flight Test—I hazard to believe it was my letter to Mr. Sabatini about the AML process that prompted his visits. Hopefully he has been documenting his (what I hear to be significant) findings during his "audits." As I’m fairly sure it was a result of my allegations to Mr. Sabatini regarding the AML process that prompted (name's) investigation, please ensure his findings are documented in detail in your report to me.
Of course, the FAA auditor did not document his findings as part of the investigation of my report, as Mr. Sabatini's August 2003 letter stated they had performed a extensive audit of Boeing's Repair Station activities, but found nothing. Any doubts you may have about the integrity of the FAA should end here, if you have any left after reading how they did not investigate my report, but said they did. In this case, they found findings of noncompliance in Boeing's Repair Station activities during the "investigation" of my report, but decided to conveniently not include those findings in the results of the investigation to protect Boeing, instead of the public I was trying to protect, and they should be trying to protect. Perhaps, alternatively, this was an off the books "pre-investigation" audit of Boeing's Repair Station to ensure no findings were found during the actual investigation of my report. It would have made no difference, however, if the FAA had done their job ethically and documented their findings as a result of the investigation of my report, or had hidden them as they did--the end result would have been the same--no assurance of any effective C/A by the TAD by Boeing for the findings, and either no follow up audits to verify compliance, or rollerstamped follow up audits stating Boeing had fixed the noncompliance, when they hadn't, such as happened with almost all of the findings that they did document as a result of their last "investigation" of my report.
The Last Inspector